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Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs:
Respecting Autonomy by Valuing Connection
KATHARINE K BAKER*
In this Article, Professor Baker analyzes how and why the law protects both
horizontal (marital) and vertical (parent/child) relationships. In doing so, she
suggests that, although the reasons to protect relationships are comparable in both
the horizontal and vertical contexts, the law is much more willing to interfere with
vertical relationships, at least when the parents are not married to each other.
From the standpoint of women's needs, this inconsistent treatment ofrelationships
is precisely backwards. Women benefit little from the law's deference to horizontal
relationships, but they could benefit substantially ifthe law was more deferential
to a single parent's relationship to her child To help alleviate the harms caused by
the law's willingness to interfere with vertical relationships, Baker suggests using
paradigms from traditional property law as a means of reorienting the law's
treatment of relationship. Although feminist scholarship often resists the sometimes
arcane and rigid rules ofproperty, Baker argues that property law's acceptance of
hierarchy, reliance on investment, and respect for boundary will better protect
women's interests than does contemporary family law doctrine.
I. INTRODUCTION
If property rights reflect relationships between people, then relationships
between people may well reflect property rights. On its face, this seems to be a
fairly straightforward syllogism. In practice, the law has proved remarkably resistant
to the logic, particularly in the family context. The law's reticence to treat family
relationships as property relationships most likely stems from a belief that such
treatment would reduce the intrinsic worth and enriching nature of familial
connection. Treating relationships as resources to which people have private
entitlements' increases the likelihood that those resources will be perceived as
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law; A.B., Harvard-Radcliffe
College, 1984; J.D., University of Chicago, 1989. I would like to thank participants in the
University of Pennsylvania's Faculty Workshop for energetic and thoughtful responses to this
piece. I would also like to thank Anita Bernstein, Jacob Core, Hal Krent, Sally Gordon, Sarah
Harding, Richard McAdams, Michelle Oberman, Joan Steinman, and Jennifer Wriggins for very
helpful comments and conversations on earlier drafts.
1 Bentham wrote that property was "nothing but a basis of expectation." JEREMY BENTHAM,
TIM TIEORY OF LEGISLATION 111 (CC. Ogden ed., Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd.
1931) (Richard Hildreth trans., 1864). Calabresi and Melamed championed the term "entitlement"
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View ofthe Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) ('The first issue which must be
faced by any legal system is one we call the problem of 'entitlement").
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commodities subject to market transactions. 2 Reducing familial relationships to
such market analysis is thought by many to foster an inferior concept of human
flourishing.3 Property constructs have many advantages in the family context,
however.4 Property paradigms bring with them notions of hierarchy and investment
that can help us define what a family is and notions of boundary and autonomy that
can help us determine what a family is not. Property's symbolic association with
boundaries and autonomy s also correlates with a long tradition of legal deference
to the family relationship. The family, as a boundaried entity,6 has been, and
arguably needs to be, treated as a unit unto itself, not a mere collection of
2 Marketability often brings with it rhetoric of fungibility, alienability, and cost-benefit
analysis that offends many peoples' normative conception of family. For the ways in which market
rhetoric affects our conception of ourselves and those around us, see Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885-86 (1987) ("[T]o see therhetoric ofthe market-
the rhetoric of fungibility, alienability, and cost-benefit analysis-as the sole rhetoric of human
afflairs is to foster an inferior conception of human flourishing."). See also ELIZABETH ANDERSON,
VALuE IN ETHICs AND ECONOMICS (1993) (discussing the ethical limitations of the marketplace).
For a critique of how the failure to use market rhetoric in the family context devalues the work that
women do, see Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE
J.L. & FE~mtMm 81 (1997).
3 See Radin, supra note 2, at 1885-86.
4 To the extent that thinking about family relationships as property entitlements runs the risk
of diminishing the uniqueness of those relationships, it is important to remember that property
entitlements need not be viewed as commercial entitlements. Property entitlements often manifest
themselves in non-market contexts. See Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on
Spouses and Strangers, 82 GEO. LJ. 2409,2418 (1994) ("Property maybe implicit in the patterns
[ofbehavior] governing who gets what in the most intimate of relationships. It is equally implicit
in the series of informal trades and 'even-up' relationships among neighbors who do favors and
services for each other... "). Most scholars of property rights and rhetoric accept the normative
propriety of a property system that includes both alienable and inalienable entitlements. See Radin,
supra note 2, at 1857-58 (stating that on the continuum between Karl Marx's
noncommodification, see KARL MARX, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of1844, in TIE
MARX-ENGELS READER 66, 70 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978), and Richard Posner's
onicommodification, see RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29-33 (2d ed. 1977),
lie the "pluralists--those who see a normatively appropriate but limited realm for commodification
coexisting with one or more nonmarket realms"). It is also important to remember that not all
family relationships are sources of enrichment or intrinsic worth. Some marriages need to end.
Many parental relationships exist in name only. Our willingness to accept property rhetoric may
depend on how valuable the relationships are to the parties involved.
5 See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 17 (1989) (Historically, "[i]ndividual autonomy was conceived of as
protected by a bounded sphere-defined primarily by property-into which the state could not
enter.").
6 For firther discussion of why the law must treat the family as an entity, see Bruce C. Hafen,
The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865 (1989).
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individuals. 7 Property rhetoric encourages such treatment because it facilitates an
image of the family as an independent entity into which the law should penetrate
only rarely.
Traditionally, family relationships were treated as property relationships, with
the husband and father essentially "owning" his wife and children.8 For the most
part, the law has discarded these old property constructs. Now, familial connection
gives rise not so much to property interests as to some form of right.9 Legal
protection of family relationships, in the form of both negative and positive rights,
extends to both horizontal and vertical relationships. Horizontal relationship rights
are those that extend to consenting adults who choose, through marriage, to define
themselves as a family. Horizontal relationship rights include the negative
constitutional right to privacy1° and the common law doctrine of family
autonomy. 11
7 For a contrary view, that is, that the family is now viewed as nothing other than a collection
of individuals, see Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. LJ. 1519, 1522(1994) (arguing thatEisenstadtv. Baird, 381 U.S. 479, marked
a watershed change in legal doctrine because it "expressed and extended to individual family
members the ideology of autonomous individualism").
8 See NoRMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW 17-20 (1982); MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH, LAw AND THE FAMILY IN NINEtENTH CENTURY AMERICA, 234-36
(1985); MARYANN MASON, FROM FATHER's PROPERTYTO CHIiDREN'S RIGHTS 6 (1994).
9 "[A] natural parent's desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children is an interest far more precious than any property right."
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,749 (1982) (quoting Lassiter v. Department of Soec. Serv., 452
U.S. 18 (1981)). Santosky addressed the question ofwhat standard ofproof was required before
the state could terminate parental rights on grounds of abuse and neglect. Lassiter involved the
right of a parent to counsel subject to such proceedings.
There have been many recent calls to dispense with the rhetoric of rights, particularly in the
family law area. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1991); Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-
Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the
Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993). This
Article argues that dispensing with rights rhetoric at this point could do women a disservice. As
Martha Minow has argued, rights can be a very powerful tool in the hands of people who, by
"claiming rights[,] implicitly invest themselves in a larger community, even in the act of seeking
to change it." Martha Minow, Re-Interpreting Rights: An Essayfor Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.L
1860, 1874 (1987). For women in families, "there is something too valuable in the aspiration of
rights and something too respectful of the power embedded in the assertions of another's need, to
abandon the rhetoric of rights." MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DEFERENCE 307 (1991).
10 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that the Bill of Rights
guarantees certain "zones of privacy").
I1 See Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Mass. 1974) ("[O]ur law has not in general
undertaken to resolve the many delicate questions inherent in the marriage relationship"); Maguire
v. Maguire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Neb. 1953) (holding that a state can not interfere in how to
allocate finances between a married couple). Interspousal immunity doctrine and spousal
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Vertical relationship rights are parental rights with regard to children. They
have both a negative and positive component. Negatively, parental rights give
married parents the right to raise and socialize their children as they choose without
interference from the state. Parents are free to inculcate values, structure obligations,
and demand compliance within the vertical relationship. Positive parental rights, on
the other hand, extend to nonmarried parents, and they are asserted through the state
against another parent Once divorced, non-married parents have the right to require
the state to do that which the state is prohibited from doing if the parents are
married, namely, monitor parental behavior, require certain rules, and dictate certain
socialization practices. Thus, by invoking one's positive parental right, a parent can
eviscerate whatever advantages might be reaped by whomever benefits from
negative parental rights.
Part I of this Article begins with an exploration of horizontal and vertical
relationships. It looks at why, when, and how the law privileges such relationships.
Many of the reasons for privileging relationships are the same in both the horizontal
and vertical contexts. Privileging the relationships, for the most part by affording
their participants the negative right to be let alone, fosters interdependence,
selflessness, and connection that is thought to be beneficial to all involved.12 The
law hesitates before regulating family relationships because such relationships need
freedom to evolve and grow as independent, self-defining entities. Family
relationships, no less than individuals, need to be let alone if their potentials for
expression, compassion, and self-enrichment are to be realized.
As Part Il explains, however, the need to be let alone is gendered.13 The
evidentiary privileges, although both are eroding somewhat, also demonstrate the legal privileges
associated with horizontal relationships. See infra note 64.
12 As many scholars have noted, the early theory for privileging familial relationships
focused on the good such relationships did for the social whole. See Hafen, supra note 6, at 874
(noting the nineteenth century legal rationalizations for "society's interest" in familial relationship);
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1447 (detailing the
ways the law traditionally granted privileged status to the marital relationship); see also Maynard
v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (noting the importance marriage has to the public); Roscoe
Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 178 (1916) (noting
that the security of the familial relationship confers economic benefits to society). More recent
trends suggest that we privilege familial relationships for the sake of the individuals involved. See
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 204 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that courts
protect familial rights because "they form so central a part of an individual's life"); Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,384 (1978) (noting that an individual enjoys a constitutional right to marry
because the "decision to marry [is] among the personal decisions protected by the right of
privacy').
13 Part I explores how women and men are likely to experience relationship and the legal
treatment of relationship differently. In exploring this difference, I do not mean to suggest that "a
unitary, 'essential,' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class,
sexual orientation, and other realities of experience." Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
1526 [Vol. 59:1523
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benefits that inure to individuals in horizontal relationships because the state does
not interfere in the relationship privilege mostly men. By treating horizontal
relationships as boundaried entities into which the law should not penetrate, the law
encourages selflessness and collectivism within the entity, but it does so at the
expense of women's respect for their own autonomy as well as women's just reward
for their disproportionate investment in relationships. The state's refusal to interfere
with horizontal relationships encourages an interdependence that provides men with
a forum for intimacy and connection, but discounts the potential dangers to women
of that interdependence and intimacy. Because many more women than men define
themselves in terms of relationships, women may not need the push towards
interdependence and intimacy that horizontal privacy protection affords. Instead,
women may need a push towards independence and autonomy.
Understanding the potential importance of that independence and autonomy for
women is critical to understanding why the law should be less willing to interfere
with vertical relationships and why property paradigms can help. Once the
horizontal relationship between a mother and father ends, the law freely interferes
with the vertical relationship between a parent and child. This interference often
quashes a woman's potential to assert herself as an individual. When horizontal
relationships end, women have renewed opportunities to express their autonomy,
but their ability to do so depends on the law recognizing women's legitimate rights,
as parents and as individuals, to be let alone. By interfering with mothers' vertical
relationships whenever fathers assert positive parental rights, that is, by allowing
non-custodial and often distant fathers to use the courts to monitor a mother's
behavior, the state ties mothers to fathers and subordinates the negative parental
rights of mothers. 14 This subordination of mothers' negative parental rights harms
not only the mother-child relationship, which needs to be let alone if it is to thrive,
but also harms the mother as an individual. Moreover, from the standpoint of
women's needs, this inconsistent legal treatment of relationship is backwards. The
law helps integrate men into relationships by respecting the marital entity, but the
law hinders women's ability to break free of relationships by not respecting the
single parent/child entity. In other words, as Part I demonstrates, men are the
primary beneficiaries of state deference in the horizontal context, and the state
defers. Women would be the primary beneficiaries of state deference in the vertical
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581,585 (1990). I do mean to suggest that one can make
helpful and verifiable generalizations about how men and women are likely to be differently
affected by the law's treatment of relationship. There is much work still to be done on how class,
race, sexual orientation, and other realities of life affect one's experience ofrelationship.
14 The overwhelming majority of single parents are women. The 1996 StatisticalAbstract
reports that 87% of the children living with only one parent are living with their mother. See
BuREAu OF THE CENSUs, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED
STATES 1996, at66 (116th ed. 1996).
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context, but the state does not defer.
Part IV explores how better to protect women's interests by recasting vertical
relationship interests as property rights. Property rules offer women the advantages
of hierarchy and relativity of title. Instead of assuming, as the law currently does,
that vertical relationship rights must be shared equally, property paradigms
acknowledge inequality and allow courts to reward people who disproportionately
invest in a relationship by clearly demarcating who has the primary interest in that
relationship. Relying in part on labor-desert theory, this kind of property paradigm
will require parents to earn the presumption that they act in their children's best
interest,15 but will allow parents who earn that presumption the freedom to structure
their lives as they choose. Benefits of property rhetoric also include its associations
with boundary and autonomy. By viewing women's vertical relationship rights as
property rights, the law is more likely to respect the integrity of vertical
relationships and less likely to assume that it has the right to interfere with that
relationship. This would benefit both women's needs for independence and
children's needs for consistency.
In the last ten years, feminist legal scholars have called for the feminization of
tort law,16 contract law,17 constitutional law,18 evidence law,19 and procedure.20
This Article will call, in part, for the masculinization of family law. It argues for a
diminished reliance on the presumptions of interdependence and connection and
calls for a new sensitivity to the importance of independence and hierarchy, offering
property paradigms2 l as tools to help refocus our concerns. The law's current
15 In other words, parents should have to earn their negative parental rights.
16 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, An Overview ofFeminist Torts Scholarsh ip, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
575 (1993); Leslie Bender, Feminist (re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848; Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence:
Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course, I YALE J.L. & FEMINIM 41 (1989).
17 See Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook,
34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065 (1985).
18 See, e.g., Mary Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights" A
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHi. L. REv. 453 (1992); Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's
Constitution, 1984 DuKE L.. 447.
19 See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413; Aviva Orenstein,
"My God!" A Feminist Crique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL.
L. REv. 159 (1997).
20 See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189
(1991); Judith Resnick, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682 (1991).
21 By arguing for the recognition ofproperty principles in the family law context, I do not
mean to suggest that family law doctrine should simply be subsumed into property doctrine any
more than the advocates for reform of tort law, contract law, and evidence, see supra notes 16-20,
suggest that those doctrines disappear once one introduces feminist principles. I am suggesting that
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presumption of interdependence and rejection of hierarchy protects men's (often)
ephemeral desire for familial connection at the expense of women's (often) latent
desire for autonomy. Property paradigms will help develop a family law that
encourages both interdependence and autonomy by allocating familial rights in a
way that honors those who actually invest in family relationships. 22
II. THE VALUE OF RELATIONSHIPS
A. Horizontal Relationships
Marriage is the primary institution through which horizontal relationships are
afforded legal recognition and protection. 23 In justifying this protection, modem-
day defenses of marriage must combat what is, to modem ears, a troubling past. The
first marriage law, instituted in Rome in 753 B.C., stated that women "were to
conform themselves entirely to the temper of their husbands and the husbands to
rule their wives as necessary and inseparable."2 4 In Rome, as in England later, legal
recognition of marriage served primarily as a means of efficient property
reallocation and distribution.25 In the Anglo-American system, this meant that "the
when the law fails to use' masculine" property concepts of hierarchy, independence, and boundary
in the family law context; it discounts women's interests. Using property paradigms helps highlight
how the law might better protect women's interests.
221 am taking as a given that the family is not a pre-political unit, but is instead a political
construct, dependent on the law for its definition. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-
26 (1989) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging that fatherhood is what the law says it is, not what
nature or blood dictate); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and The Market: A Study ofIdeolo gy and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497,1504 n.26 (1983) [hereinafter Olsen, The Family and The
Market] (acknowledging the theory that a family may exist only through its legal definition);
Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. McH. JL. REFORM 835 (1985)
(arguing against governmental intervention in families).
23 Some of the right of association cases suggest that certain horizontal relationships not
protected by marriage nonetheless enjoy some protection from state interference. See Board of Dir.
of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 541-46 (1987); Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
618-20 (1984); see also Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539, 1544 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
right to intimate association extends to a non-marital relationship between a police officer and the
daughter of a reputed organized crime figure).
2 4 R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The 'Appropriate' Victims ofMarital
Violence, 2 ViCrIMoLoGY 426,427 (1977-1978) (quoting JULIAO'FAOLAIN & LAUCO MARTNES,
NOT IN GOD'S IMAGE 53 (1974)).
2 5 See MARY BECKER Er AL., FEMINISr JURISPRUDENCE 471 (1993). Formal man'iages were
limited to people with property and were used, as they still are, to determine which offspring
would be entitled to inherit. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding state
restrictions requiring that illegitimate children be legitimated before the decedent's death if they
are to be entitled to inherit pursuant to state law).
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very being and [legal] existence of the woman [was] suspended during the
[marriage], or entirely merged or incorporated [into] that of the husband."2 6 The
abolition of coverture and the Married Women's Property Acts27 helped alleviate
some of the more blatantly subordinating effects of marriage for women, but many
feminists remained hostile to the institution. In the early twentieth century, Emma
Goldman wrote, "The institution of marriage makes a parasite of woman .... It
incapacitates her for life's struggle, annihilates her social consciousness, paralyzes
her imagination, and then imposes its gracious protection, which is in reality a snare,
a travesty on human character."28 In the late twentieth century, Martha Fineman
argues for the complete abolition of marriage, 29 while Nancy Polikoff characterizes
marriage as "the worst of mainstream society" and "an inherently problematic
institution."30
Neither the popularity nor legal recognition of this inherently problematic
institution seems to be in serious jeopardy, however, at least for heterosexuals. 31
When forced to articulate why, courts and theorists generally argue along three
lines. First, horizontal bonding is central to human happiness and is a critical form
26 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *432.
27 For a discussion of the history and abolition of coverture and the Married Women's
Property Acts, see BASCH, supra note 8, at 17-29 and Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of
Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127
(1994).
2 8 EMMAGOLDMAN, Marriage and Love, in RED EMMA SPEAKS 158, 164-65 (Alix Kates
Shulman ed., 1972).
29 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXuAL FAMILY AND
OTHERTWENTH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 5 (1995) (proposing that all relationships between adults
should be private, non-privileged agreements).
30 Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will Not "Disnmtle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, " 79 VA. L. REV.
1535, 1536 (1993). At a more theoretical level, many feminists critique the separation ofthe public
and private spheres that marriage embodies, if not defines.
Feminists conclude that the "separate" liberal worlds of private and public are actually
interrelated.... [Feminists] have shown how the family is a major concern of the state and
how, through legislation concerning marriage and sexuality and the policies of the welfare
state, the subordinate status of women is presupposed by and maintained by the power of the
state.
Carol Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
iN SOCIALLE, 296-97 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983).
31 The significant number of gay men and lesbians working for the right to marry suggests
that marriage is also a popular institution in the gay community. See Evan Wolfson, Crossing the
Threshold: Equal Marriage Rightsfor Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique,
21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567,584 (1994).
1530 [Vol. 59:1523
PROPERTYRULES, FEMTNISTNEEDS
of self-expression. Second, intimacy is a good, in and of itself, and breeds many
other important qualities and conditions in those who experience it. Third,
relationship is a necessary precondition for independence and liberty. This Part
explores each of these claims in turn. Taken together, these analyses of relationship
suggest that if the expressive, intimate, and autonomy-promoting benefits of
horizontal bonds are to be realized, then the state must recognize marriage as a legal
category and be careful not to interfere too much with the relationship.
In perhaps the most famous Supreme Court affirmation of marriage, Justice
Douglas wrote that marriage "is an association that promotes a way of life, not
causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions."32 Fleshing out that noble purpose in Bowers v. Hardwick,
Justice Blackmun wrote that "we protect the family because it contributes so
powerfully to the happiness of individuals .... -33 Comparably, in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, Justice Brennan wrote for the majority that "[f]amily relationships,
by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few
other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts,
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one's life."34 We
protect these relationships because "individuals draw much of their emotional
enrichment from close ties with others." 35 In other words, horizontal relationships
can make us happy.36 The Supreme Court has consistently expressed its belief that
the happiness that intimate relationships bring us is of such fundamental importance
that the government must be very careful when interfering with such relationships.
At a more theoretical level, several legal scholars have delved into why the
intimate community found in horizontal relationships makes us happy. Milton
Regan has developed a thoughtful and comprehensive theory of intimacy and how
the law should respect it.37 He argues that "marriage ... is not simply a valuable
32 Griswold v. Connecticut, 581 U.S. 479,486 (1965).
33 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,205 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,500-06 (1977)).
34 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984).
35 l at 619.
36 As Kenneth Karst states simply, "to be human is to need to love and be loved." Kenneth
L. Karst, The Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALEL.J. 624,632 (1980).
37 See MILTON C. REGAN, JL, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSur OF INTIMACY 96 (1993)
[hereinafter REGAN, FAMILY LAW] ("Status is the embodiment of [marital] responsibility, a
proclamation that certain intimate relationships ... give rise to obligation because they shape each
partner's sense of self.'); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and
Property Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2382-2406 (1994) [hereinafter Regan, Spouses and
Strangers] (proposing that divorce settlements make each spouse's standard of living equal);
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045
(1995) [hereinafter Regan, Spousal Privilege] (discussing the spousal privilege doctrine in the
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vehicle for achieving personal satisfaction.... [I]t is a web of interdependence, a
'shared history in which two people are bound together in part by what they have
been through together."' 38 The interdependence that characterizes intimate
relationships makes those relationships self-constitutive. Building on the work of
Meir Dan-Cohen,39 Regan argues that choosing to become part of an interdependent
relationship means choosing to accept responsibility in a manner that necessarily
involves a kind of self-expression and self-development 40 Kenneth Karst's vision
of intimacy is comparable: "When this choice [to enter into an intimate relationship]
is exercised[,] ... the caring partner affirms her autonomy and her responsibility by
choosing the commitment."41
The entity created by an intimate relationship is uniquely personal to the parties
involved. From each individual's perspective, it is his choice, his feelings, and his
actions, that, working in concert with the choices, feelings, and actions of the other,
create another entity. This entity expresses the selves of the parties because of the
inherently personal nature of the labor involved.42 As Regan states,
"spouses... don't simply help each other construct separate individual
identities .... whey participate in the creation of a shared ... identity .... "43 Thus,
honoring and protecting a relationship is a way of honoring and protecting self-
expression.44 Intimacy and identity are interrelated.45 It follows, therefore, that if
context of the dichotomy between the internal and external stances toward marriage).
3 8 REGAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 37, at 96 (quoting R. BELLAH ET AL., HABrrS OF THE
HEART 103 (1985)); see also Karst, supra note 36, at 629 ("Intimate association depend[s] on
[a] sense of shared collectivity, the shared sense that 'we' exist as something beyond 'you' and
'me."').
3 9 See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Law, Community and Communication, 1989 DUKE LJ.
1654 (discussing legal and social theory in relation to community, interpretation, communication,
and organization); Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 959 (1992) (articulating and analyzing the constitutive responsibility paradigm, which views
a person's responsibility as a facet of that person's nature).
40 See Regan, Spousal Privilege, supra note 37, at 2088-89.
41 Karst, supra note 36, at 633.
42 In the dissent in Bowers, Justice Blackmun noted the critical element that choice plays in
relationships: "[M]uch of the richness of arelationship will come from the freedom an individual
has to choose the form and nature of [ ] intensely personal bonds." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43 REGAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 37, at 94.
44 For many, of course, marriage is also a religious experience. Its religious roots enhance the
spiritual nature of the self-expression and strengthen constitutional arguments against state
interference. It is important to remember, however, that marriage could easily be a religious
experience without being a legal one.
45 Karst argues in a somewhat different vein that "intimate associations ... give [someone
his or her] best chance to be seen (and thus to see himself) as a whole person rather than as an
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the state were to regulate intimate relationships too significantly it would be
interfering with an important form of self-expression--one that is critical to
personal enrichment and identity.
Regan goes further, however, to argue that one's discernable role within a
relationship is critical to the development of the relationship's entity status because
roles "offer[ ] a model of identity defined in terms of communal norms, which can
root the self in context."46 This teleologic view of marital roles closely parallels the
channeling function that Carl Schneider suggests for family law.47 Schneider argues
that the institution of marriage serves an efficiency function, by "sav[ing] our lovers
from having to invent their own language," and an integrative function, by
"help[ing] integrate members of society over time and place."48 Life is easier-and
better-with such roles, Regan and Schneider argue, because we have a model to
work from and, more important that model shows us the acceptability and rich
tradition of interdependency.49
In 1927, Justice Brandeis wrote that:
[T]he makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit ofhappiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect .... They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone....50
If, as Regan, Schneider, and Karst collectively argue, intimacy and identity are
integrally related and if in choosing our intimate relationships we create unique
aggregate of social roles," but Karst concurs with Regan in finding intimate relationships critical
to self-determination. See Karst, supra note 36, at 635-36. "[O]ur intimate associations are
powerfl influences over the development of our personalities." Id at 636.
4 6 REGAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 37, at 89.
4 7 See Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRAL. REV.
495 (1992). Schneider offers a tennis analogy. Just as knowing about the institution oftennis-the
roles, obligations, and different behaviors that make the game enjoyable-facilitates the lives of
those who happen upon a net, a ball, and two tennis rackets, so knowing about the institution of
marriage facilitates the lives of lovers who want to spend their lives together. See id. at 511.
48 Id. at 508, 511.
4 9 For Regan, the roles that facilitate intimacy and interdependency are at risk in a post-
modem world because a constant search for an authentic self leads one to avoid context, indeed
to avoid too much connection to anything or anyone. "[Tjhe late twentieth century is marked by
'role distance'--a greater sense of an authentic self that stands apart from the roles that it may be
asked to play." REGAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 37, at 34. The post-modem 'ragmentation of
the self may result in less emotional investment in any particular personal relationship." Id. at 89.
If we constantly strive to define ourselves, we have less time to invest in others and, therefore, less
time to experience the enhanced form of self-expression that relationship affords.
50 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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interdependencies that themselves constitute self-expression, then horizontal
relationships must be viewed as souls with their own emotions, sensations, and
beliefs. And they must be entities that have the right to be let alone by the
government.51
The value of self-expression is not the only one that flows from relationship,
however. The fusing of personalities that follows from a relationship leads to an
expanded vision of the self, such that one's own self-interest becomes blurred into
that to whom one feels connected.52 Hence, familial responsibilities "liberate us"
to find that which we otherwise would not find in ourselves.53 To use Regan's
example, a parent who dives into the water to save her drowning child is acting in
her own self-interest as well as her child's.54 One takes care of one's dying lover,
not because he deserves it, but because one wants to. An attempt to separate the two
lovers' needs is as pointless as an attempt to figure out whose interest is most served
by a mother rescuing her child. Thus, Lawrence Houlgate discusses the normative
benefits that flow from seeing his solicitude not as something he "owes" his wife
because she has earned it, but as something that flows as an instinctive obligation.55
"The mere need of others in my family for my benevolent attention suffices for my
obligation to give it" 56 Everyone benefits from institutions that serve the needy and
dependent in this manner because that which would be borne by the totality is
instead borne by the smaller functional unit. Moreover, if we can agree that caring
and selflessness are values that we think benefit not only individuals but society as
a whole, we should endorse institutions that foster them.57 The state is simply
incapable of nurturing the same kind of caring selflessness because obligations
imposed by the state will always seem more a matter of duty than self-interest The
benefit of the family is that one meets the needs of dependency not because it is a
51 Regan would also argue that if the state fails to respect roles within these relationships, it
risks destroying the very relationships it is supposed to respect. He suggests that the state should
respect these roles by awarding alimony based on a theory of interdependence. See Regan, Spouses
and Strangers, supra note 37, at 2406-07.
52 See REGAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 37, at 113.
53 To love and be loved is good because it allows us to explore just how giving we can be.
See Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning ofBelonging, 1991
BYU L. REV. 1, 41; see also Hafen, supra note 6, at 912 ('Bonds of lasting intimacy leave family
members undeniably vulnerable, but the same relationships and loyalties that seem to tie us down
are, paradoxically, the sources of strength most likely to lift us up.").
54 See REGAN, FAMILY LAW, supra note 37, at 113. Regan also cites studies of the rescuers
of Jews in Nazi Europe who tended not to view their decision to help as a choice, but as a
spontaneous obligation that sprang from within them. See id. at 114.
55 See LAURENCE D. HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE 39 (1988).
56 Id. Houlgate's vision of family distributional justice seems to resemble the familiar
collectivist call of: "From each according to his ability. To each according to his need."
57 See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Moral Discourse andFamily Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 430 (1985).
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social duty, but because meeting such needs is a part of who one is.
The collectivism and selflessness that mark intimate relationships also give rise
to alternative visions ofjustice. As Kenneth Karst notes, "marriage is an association
emphasizing 'shared commitment' rather than rules .... The resolution of
differences between spouses who intend to stay together looks toward healing the
relationship for the future, not settling up old transgressions." 58 Houlgate writes,
"when we come home to our families, we return to a relationship of intimacy,
defined by conditions of mind, not overt action, by trust and devotion instead of
formal rules, rights, and duties."59
Our formal systems ofjustice are particularly bad at adjudicating disputes in
such relationships.60 Lee Teitelbaum suggests that the law's failure in this regard
stems from its focus on individuals and specific sets of behaviors.61 As a general
matter, the law looks at individual behavior to determine whether any given action
violates defined, objectively-discernable norms of conduct. Because intimate
relationships are an entity, and expressions, behaviors, and obligations within that
entity flow not from objective and discernable principles but from established
patterns and a relationally specific sense of duty,62 the law is ill-equipped to
determine questions of fairness.
Moreover, the law is unable or extremely reluctant to dismiss past
transgressions in the hope or faith that the perpetrator will not do something wrong
again. Yet this kind of forgiveness is common if not critical in ongoing
relationships. A relationship worthy of the name can survive only if the parties
recognize that a future together is more important than the actions of the past. One's
faith in the future may have everything to do with one's understanding of the past,
but the endurance and health of the relationship is a matter of subjective faith, not
objective fact Abstract legal principles and objective methodologies have no way
of evaluating the strength of that faith. By keeping the law out of relationships, we
58 Karst, supra note 36, at 639.
59 HOULGATE, supra note 55, at 35.
60 In my Family Law class, I usually start the semester by asking this question designed to
analyze when we are comfortable invoking formal systems ofjustice: "If you are walking down
the street and see two men in a fist fight are you likely to call the police?" The answer to that
question is usually' maybe."I then ask whether the student is more or less likely to call the police
if the two people know each other. Without a doubt, students respond that they are less likely. I
ask why. The responses are usually something along these lines: "The parties probably know how
to work it out;" "They may do this all the time;" "They probably do not want me to;" "The police
won't know enough about the situation to do the right thing." At a minimum, these responses
suggest a distrust of third party intervention into personal, ongoing relationships.
6 1 See Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History andFanily Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135,1177.
62 By this I mean a sense of duty that grows from the particular relationship itself. Each
relationship has its own unique duties and obligations that exist as a function of the unique entity
created by blending two separate identities.
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force the parties to evaluate that faith on their own. We force the parties to learn
how to work it out.
Legal rights give public expression to conflict and by doing so may harm the
parties' abilities to work these conflicts out.63 By refusing to adjudicate disputes
within horizontal relationships, the state privileges the alternative, more collectivist;
and forward-looking construction ofjustice associated with family.64 As Kenneth
Karst remarks: "There are sound reasons for the state to leave the members of an
ongoing intimate association alone, to let them carry on their relations with a
minimum of state intervention. If they cannot work out their differences, the exits
are clearly marked. '65
This alternative, familial construction ofjustice also has value for many people
because it provides an escape from the alienation bred by objective rules and
autonomous interactions. The family offers an alternative to a world "in which our
relationships with others are largely abstract and formalistic .... -66 The family can
63 See MINOW, supra note 9, at 289-91. Minow makes this point in evaluating Justice
Powell's dissent in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). In Goss, the plaintiffs, bringing a
procedural due process claim after being suspended from school without any process, argued that
they were, as individuals, entitled to certain rights. See id. at 568-69. Justice Powell, arguing in
dissent that the state should not interfere with the school's summary procedures, focused on how,
by affording the students the right to publicly express their grievance, the Court would impose an
adversarial dynamic on a student-teacher relationship that can finction effectively only if it is seen
as non-adversarial. See id. at 593-94 (Powell, J., dissenting). The same argument can be made with
regard to affording legal rights within horizontal relationships.
64 One of the justifications for the spousal immunity doctrine relies on the need to protect the
relational entity even if it means sacrificing individual rights. At common law, neither husband nor
wife were allowed to sue each other. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATEs 631-32 (2d ed. 1987). Many of the reasons given for the
doctrine were rooted to the legal unity of husband and wife and the wife's accordant inability to
own property. These rationales died with the Married Women's Property Acts, but courts
continued to protect the immunity under any of a number of different theories including the
importance of protecting family harmony, the potential for fraud and collusion, and the trivial
nature of the disputes. See id. at 635-36. While many of these justifications seem rooted in an
outdated view of the family that gives inadequate weight to the possible importance of individual,
particularly female, rights within the family, if it is true that rights give public expression to conflict
and may thereby threaten relationship, there may be reasons not to abandon the doctrine
completely. See Regan, Spousal Priilege, supra note 37, at 2049 (explaining the spousal
testamentary privileges as, in part, reflecting the view that marriage is a universe of "shared
meaning... [in which each] ... spouse stands inside the marriage as a participant who accepts its
claims, not outside it as an observer who calls those claims into question").
65 Karst, supra note 36, at 640 (citing Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and
Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 292 (1973)).
66 HOULGATE, supra note 55, at 35. Some have argued that the current understanding of the
nuclear family developed during the nineteenth century as a refuge from the fears associated with
the emerging and threatening values of egalitarianism and individualism. See John Demos, Images
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provide this alternative haven only if the state resists intruding. Too much state
interference will turn family interactions into formal, abstract relationships.
The final important justification for privileging horizontal relationships stems
from the role such relationships play in providing a community and, hence, a sense
of autonomy. The family acts as the first-level community mediating the inevitable
tension that exists between individual and state.67 Families help individuals traverse
that vast intermediate space between the self and everyone else by providing a core
of others to whom one belongs and to whom one can claim as one's own.68 Without
that sense of belonging, we cannot develop a sense of autonomy because we form
our personalities, thoughts, and passions only through interaction with the
communities of which we are a part.69 Jennifer Nedelsky writes: "If we ask
ourselves what actually enables people to be autonomous, the answer is not
isolation, but relationships .... -170 "[A]utonomy is a capacity, not a static human
characteristic .... What is essential to the development of autonomy is not
protection against intrusion but constructive relationship." 71
Too much state interference in our relationships destroys our sense of
community. It is the unique nature of our communities, the distinct entities formed
by the blending of personalities, that allows us to claim our relationships as our own.
By understanding how we are the same and different from those through whom we
define ourselves, we claim our own autonomy. If the state provides that definition
for us, the relationship cannot serve the mediating function that allows people to
come to a full understanding of their own autonomy.
Thus, contemporary justifications for legal marriage emphasize the expressive,
enriching, and morally beneficial roles that horizontal relationships play in our lives.
Horizontal relationships enable us to come to know ourselves as more than
ofthe American Family, Then andNow, in CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 43,49-51 (Virginia
Tufte & Barbara Myerhoffeds., 1979). For criticism of this position, see Arlene Skolnik, Public
Images, Private Realities: The American Family in Popular Culture and Social Science, in
CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY, supra, at 297, 310-14 (arguing that the sentimental moral
family never really existed).
67 The sense of alienation and atomism that has led some to call for a resurgence of the
importance of family, see supra note 66; Hafen, supra note 6; Hafen, supra note 53, may be a
response to what Gerald Frug calls the liberal movement toward 'ndermining... the vitality of
all groups that... [hold] an intermediate position between what we now think of as the sphere of
the individual and that of the state." Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REv. 1059, 1088 (1980).
68 See Hafen, supra note 53, at 10 ("[Failies] protect autonomous development ofpersonal
values and preferences ... while also teaching the value of belonging to a larger social order.").
6 9 See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150-51(1982).
70 Nedelsky, supra note 5, at 12.
71 Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and The Bounded Se, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF
CULTURE 162, 168 (Robert Posted., 1991).
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independent actors governed by external norms and obligations. Imposing state-
mandated norms and obligations on individuals within marriage runs the risk of
obliterating the very qualities that make horizontal relationships worthwhile.
B. Vertical Relationships
If marriage is the primary institution through which the state honors horizontal
relationships, parenthood is the primary institution through which the state honors
vertical relationships. Any discussion of parenthood, however, must start with an
acknowledgement of how little we know about who a parent is. Parents are not
merely those who have donated genetic material to a child. "Parental rights do not
spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They
require relationships more enduring."72 Parent/child-like relationships do not confer
parental rights upon the parent-like adults either. Stepparents, who often share
financial responsibility, disciplinary obligations, and nurturing duties with a
biological parent, enjoy no concurrent parental rights to their stepchildren.7 3 Even
men who have both a biological connection to a child and an extensive relationship
with that child do not necessarily enjoy parental rights.74 Thus, a man has no
constitutional protection of his paternal status unless he was married to the mother
at the time of the birth of the child and the mother agrees to his paternity75 or he has
a blood connection to the child, a relationship with the child, a relationship with the
mother, and the mother is not married to someone else.76
72 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,260 (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohamed, 441 U.S. 380,
397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). In Lehr, the Court ruled that a biological father does not
necessarily have the right to veto another parent's adoption of his child. See id; see also Quilloin
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (holding that a biological father with no connection to the child
does not have the right to veto the adoption of that child).
73 See David L. Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law's Perceptions of
"Family" after Divorce, in DivORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102, 108-09 (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990); see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for
Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (holding that foster parents do not have a sufficient liberty
interest in their relationship with their foster children to require a hearing to determine who should
be vested with parental rights).
74 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding California's presumption
that the husband of the mother at the time of the child's birth is the father of that child even though
the non-spouse, biological father of that child had intermittently lived with and supported both the
child and the mother for the first four years of the child's life).
75 See id.
76 See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: JudicialAsswnptions AboutParenthood, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 637 (1993). As Janet Dolgin carefully analyzes, the Court is concerned as much with the
character of the father's relationship with the mother as it is with the character of the father's
relationship with his children. The closer the family members' relationship resembles the
stereotypical nuclear family, the more likely the Court is to acknowledge paternal rights. See id.
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Motherhood tends to be a less contentious matter although reproductive
technologies are beginning to change this. 77 A California court conferred legal
maternal status on a genetic donor, whose claims to the child were being challenged
by the gestational mother.78 The court ruled that because the genetic donor
"intended to bring about the birth of the child that she intended to raise as her own,"
she was entitled to legal parental status.79 A significant number of state statutes still
have ambiguous definitions of mother,80 but to date, none of those statutes have
been challenged constitutionally.81
Assuming one does meet the legal criteria for either motherhood or fatherhood,
one's substantive rights to a relationship with the child depend on whether the
vertical relationship is supported by a horizontal relationship. For married parents,
the rights associated with their status as parents afford them negative liberty from
state intervention into the rearing of their children. Negative parental rights afford
at 657. See generally Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A TheoreticalAnalysis
in Context, 72 Tax. L. REv. 967 (1994) (arguing that parental claims should be determined by
considering genetic relationship, assumption of responsibility, and provision of care to the child);
Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers 'Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the
Perpetuation ofPatriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 60 (1995) (exploring alternative approaches to
unwed fathers' rights in the adoption context).
77 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (regarding a dispute over
the parental rights of a surrogate mother and the couple who supplied the fertilized embryo); In re
Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.L 1988) (regarding a dispute over the parental rights of a surrogate
mother and the biological father and his wife).
7 8 See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 786.
7 9 See &l. at 782. For further discussion of this argument, see John Lawrence Hill, WhatDoes
it Mean to Be A "Parent"? The Claims ofBiology AsA Basisfor Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 353, 369-81 (1991). But see In reBaby M, 537 A.2d at 1264, in which the court refused to
grant maternal status to the wife of the biological father of the child even though the biological
father and his wife, not the gestational mother, originally intended to parent the child.
80 Some state statutes define "mother" as the "natural" mother without explaining what
happens if the woman who beam the child is not the woman who donated the genetic material. See
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020(2) (Michie Supp. 1996); Ma. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 17001
(West 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:1 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-12 (1997). Georgia
defines "mother" as the "biological or adoptive mother" without explaining whether the
"biological" nexus need be genetic or gestational. See GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(10.2) (Supp.
1998). Other states define "mother" as the woman who gave birth to the child. See CoNN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45a-604(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/4 (West 1993).
North Dakota defines "mother" as the woman who donated the genetic material to the child. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-19-01 (1997).
81 Such a challenge could be forthcoming. In Lehr v. Robertson, Justice Stevens explained
that the process of carrying a child to term invests the mother who carries the child with more
parental rights than a man who has "only" donated genetic material and has therefore not made as
much of an investment. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258-62 (1983).
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parents a presumption that they act in their children's best interest.82 Parents have
the right to discipline their child, to educate their child, to choose medical treatment
and religious tradition for their child, to decide where their child shall live, and to
determine who may visit the child and in whose care the child shall be placed. 83 The
propriety of vesting parents with this power stems both from the realization that
"[m]ost children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound
judgements concerning many decisions"84 and the concern that vesting such
decisions in the state could lead to a kind of homogeneous state socialization that
is "wholly different from [the concept of individual] upon which our institutions
rest .... "85
The Court has made clear that parents have the primary right and responsibility
to regulate the behavior of their children.86 Thus, notwithstanding the state'sparens
patriae authority,87 and in stark contrast to the kind of socialization process that
Plato envisioned, 88 "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who
nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."89 Parents have rights "to
bring up [a] child in the way he should go."90 The "primary role of the parents in the
upbringing of their children is... established beyond debate as an enduring
82 See Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence historically has
reflected ... concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority... ."). Thus, parents
make decisions for children that, if the children were adults, the children would make for
themselves.
83 See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for
Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 884-
85(1984).
84 Parham, 442 U.S. at 603.
85 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,402 (1923). The Court contrasted what it saw as the
American individualism ideal with the kind of state education proposed by Plato in The Ideal
Commonwealth. Plato envisioned a society in which "children [were] to be common, and no
parent [was] to know his own child. .." so that the state could properly inculcate the values most
appropriate for the Commonwealth. See id. at 401-02 (citations omitted in original).
86 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal [to] us that the
custody, care, and nurture of the child reside fi-st in the parents, whose primary finction and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." (citation
omitted)).
87 The parens patriae power allows the state to act to protect children from their own
inability to protect themselves. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 162.
88 See supra note 85.
89 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
90 Prince, 321 U.S. at 164. Prince is often cited for the proposition that the state must not
interfere in family life, but Prince is one of the few constitutional parental rights cases in which
the Court held that the government regulation was permissible. Mrs. Prince was a single parent.
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American tradition." 91 The right to socialize one's children is part of "the private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter" 92 because "[i]t is through the
family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural. '93 Moreover, the state is not free to evaluate any particular parent's
socialization process absent compelling circumstances. 94 The state must produce
clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness before it terminates married
parents' rights to socialize their children.95
Thus, the negative right to raise one's children as one chooses brings with it a
critical instrumental benefit-the socialization of children.96 What the Court has not
fully explained, however, is who benefits from that protected socialization process.
Upon examination, one sees that the answer is everyone-the parent, the child, and
society as a whole. Understanding how those benefits run is important to
understanding how and why the vertical relationship needs protection.
As various scholars have analyzed, parents reap substantial benefits from
vertical relationships. Stephen Gilles suggests that "[t]he project of parenting-
having, nurturing, and educating one's children-is central to our conception of
human flourishing."97 Jeffrey Blustein submits that adults have and raise children
"not because... [the children] will continue the family, or are potential sources of
relief and aid, but because they are new bonds of love." 98 After all, as Kenneth
Karst argues in the context of horizontal intimacy, "to be human is to need to love
91 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,232 (1972).
92 Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
93 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (citation omitted).
94 As Justice Stewart stated:
If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the
parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to
do so was thought to be in the children's best interest, I should have little doubt that the State
would have intruded impennissibly on the "private realm of family life which the state cannot
enter."
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); see also
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families
for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
9 5 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982).
9 6 See generally Bartlett, supra note 83, at 890 (describing the view that protecting parental
Tights serves instrumental goals).
97 Stephen Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHi. L. REV. 937,
962 (1996).
98 Jeffrey Blustein, Child Rearing and Family Interests, in HAVING CHILDREN 115, 118
(Onora O'Neill & William Ruddick eds., 1979).
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and be loved."9 9 Children are an outlet and an inlet for love.
Parenting is also a form of self-expression. Gilles argues that parental authority
to educate children should be protected from state interference precisely because
socializing one's children is a form of speech that is critical to the parents' protected
rights of self-expression 3 00 David Richards writes that "[c]hild-rearing is one of the
ways in which many people fulfill and express their deepest values about how life
is to be lived."10 1 Katharine Bartlett explains in a somewhat different tone, but in
strains that resonate with some of the theories developed in Part H.A, that child
rearing allows adults to accept freely the obligations of parenthood as a means of
trying to realize their "ennobled selves." 102 "'n this sense, responsibility is a form
of self-expression."'103
The self-sacrifice implicit in parenting also requires caretakers to (re)define
themselves in the context of their children. Parenthood often forces parents to find
within themselves a selflessness that they did not know they had. One father, who
accepted primary caretaking responsibility, comments:
Children are greed machines; they're inhuman, [and] amoral.... You give and
give all day long and they take and take .... You can't love children in the abstract;
not if you take care of them every day .... You have to get into self-sacrifice, or
you'll end up abusing them ... But it's been the best thing that's ever happened to
me. I know my kids now. You can't love anyone you don't know .... And they
love me.104
Therefore, raising children is good for parents-in part because it provides a bond
of love, in part because it involves a form of self-expression, and in part because the
self-sacrifice entailed allows for the development of a higher moral being. 10 5 Hence,
99 Karst, supra note 36, at 632.
100 See Gilles, supra note 97, at 1015 ("Speech and expression are the ordinary means
whereby parents seek to impart values, habits, skills and knowledge to their children.).
101 David A J. Richards, The Indidual, The Family and The Constitution: A Jurisprudential
Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1980).
102 See Bartlett, supra note 9, at 301 (citing NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FEmINNE
APPROACH TO ETIcs AND MORAL EDUCATION 5 (1984)). This reasoning parallels Milton Regan's
use of Dan-Cohen's responsibility as self-expression theory. See supra text accompanying notes
38-40.
103 Bartlett, supra note 9, at 301.
104 JANE SWIGART, THE MYTH OF THE BAD MOTIMR 118-19 (1991) (quoting unidentified
father).
105 Bruce Hafen tells a story of his wife's willingness to calmly, but unrelentlessly, sit with
their son and force him to complete a project he had no interest in completing. When asked how




we see that the benefits of vertical relationships for adults are not very much
different from the benefits of horizontal relationships. Vertical relationships are
another form of intimate connection that fosters self-expression and moral growth.
Moreover, the essence of that vertical bond must remain free from too much
governmental interference for the same reasons applicable in Part II.A. Were the
state to interfere with the vertical relationship, it would compromise the
relationship's ability to thrive as a source of self-expression.10 6 Comparably,
accepting parental responsibility can only serve a self-constitutive function if the
decision to accept that responsibility comes from within and not from external
mandate. The benefits of finding one's own capacity and desire for self-sacrifice
disappear if the state mandates that self-sacrifice.
Adults are not the only beneficiaries of the parent-child relationship, however.
Children benefit from intimate vertical relationships in two ways. First, as the
beneficiaries of the educational and socialization process that is an inherent part of
child rearing, children learn how to be adults. Second, as emotionally dependent
human beings, children rely on the emotional attachment implicit in vertical
relationships.
A parent's constitutional right to "bring up a child in the way he should go,"110 7
benefits the child because, without the kind of value-laden educational process that
child rearing involves, children would not have a value structure from which to
operate. Gilles writes that "parents' loving efforts to transmit their values help form
[ ] children's characters, enable them to learn what it is to have a coherent way of
life, and develop their capacity to enter into caring, long-term relationships with
others."108 As the Court noted in Smith, day to day contact breeds not only love and
knowledge of the other, but an ability to socialize.109 "[T]he importance of the
familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association and from
the role it plays in 'promot[ing] a way of life' through instruction of children." 110
The socialization function that parents fulfill teaches a child not only what is right
and what is wrong, but, more importantly, that there is a difference between right
and wrong. Parents may transmit values as a form of their own self-expression, but
106 As Bartlett notes, "a tight, comprehensive set of [governmental] controls would remove
from parents the discretion to act, upon which the capacity of moral decisionmaking actually
depends." Bartlett, supra note 9, at 301.
107 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
108 Gilles, supra note 97, at 941.
109 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844
(1977).
110 Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,231-33 (1972) (second modification in
original)). The Court in Smith went on to say that the fact of the blood relationship weighed into
the importance of the family relationship. See id.
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in doing so they provide their children with the understanding that coherent value
structures exist. Whether any individual young adult accepts the value system with
which she was socialized is irrelevant to the importance of having received, at an
early age, an understanding of what values are. One's ability to learn and reason and
develop depends in part on having some sort of belief system from which to
operate." 1 This is the guidance implicit in the term child "rearing."
As Stephen Gilles points out, teaching one's children and loving one's children
are necessarily one in the same task because "nurturing a child cannot sensibly or
practically be divorced from shaping that child's values." 112 Thus, the second way
in which children benefit from vertical relationships flows from the first. Children
need nurturance, not just because they need to learn values, but because they need
to learn love. However, even though human beings may need to love and be loved,
children are particularly needy because "only a child who has at least one person
whom he can love, and who also feels loved, valued and wanted by that person, will
develop a healthy self-esteem."' 13 Children need to know consistent love if they are
ever to be able to love themselves.1 14 Just as they need to come to know right and
wrong, they need to come to know love. They come to know this by having a
vertical bond to which they belong.
A vertical relationship in which a child is taught so that she is capable of
learning and in which a child is loved so that she is capable of loving allows a child
to grow into autonomy. Again, what allows people to be autonomous is relationship.
As Jennifer Nedelsky suggests, one cannot really be autonomous without feeling
autonomous, 1 5 and one cannot feel autonomous without having a sense of what
connection is.116 Children need a distinct relationship because they need to be able
to identify themselves with something bigger than themselves, but smaller than the
vast public other.117 Too much state interference with that vertical relationship
111 See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 152 (1981) (explaining that
"knowing how to apply the law is itself possible only for someone who possesses the virtue of
justice"); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONAL1TY? (1988) (discussing the
connection between rationality, justice, and laws).
112 Gilles, supra note 97, at 967.
1 13 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ETAL., BEYOND THE BEST INEREs OF THE CHILD 20 (1973).
114 See Mary D. Ainsworth, The Effects ofMaternal Deprivation: A Review ofFindings and
Controversy in the Context ofResearch Strategy, in DEPRIVATION OF MATERNAL CARE 97, 143
(1962); ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY AND THE LIFE CYCLE 122-31 (1980); Nadia Ehrlich
Finckelstein, Children in Limbo, 25 Soc. WORK 100 (1980).
1 15 See Nedelsky, supra note 5, at 24.
1 16 Children need to belong to something because, as Martha Minow acknowledges,
"belonging is essential to becoming." Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything that
Grows:" Toward a History ofFamily Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 819, 894.
1 17 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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destroys the distinctiveness of that to which the child belongs. Children need to be
able to claim a relationship as their own.118 By protecting the organic growth of
vertical relationships, we allow children to benefit from the sense of belonging
implicit in being apart of a unique relationship.
Before moving on, it is worth noting that the liberal state also benefits from
vertical relationship protection. Because the government is prevented from
affirmatively sponsoring certain religious, cultural, or political beliefs,1 19 the state
may not be able to provide the kind of value-laden education that children need as
a baseline. By delegating the socialization function to parents, liberal society
benefits because the citizens that emerge from the process are capable of the kind
of ethical, rational, and reasonable behavior necessary for a democracy to function.
We vest parents with negative rights in part because the government benefits from
the benefit that the children receive when parents are free to inculcate their children
with their own values.120 As both Bruce Hafen and Steve Gilles have pointed out,
this kind of individualized socialization function performed by parents helps
develop adults for a pluralist society.1 21
Perhaps surprisingly, remarkably few parents or children enjoy the negative
parental rights that I have just analyzed and that the Supreme Court has so
emphatically upheld. Approximately 26% (17 million) of children live with a
divorced, separated, or stepparent and another 7.7% (4.9 million) live with a never-
married parent.122 Thus, almost one-third of the children in this country must live
with the ramifications of positive parental rights. 23 Positive parental rights give
non-married parents the ability to invoke the state's help in monitoring the other
parent's behavior. In these situations, it is the state that determines how the child
should be raised. If one parent disagrees with how the other parent wants to raise the
118 The critical contribution of arguably the most influential book on the law of children
establishes that children need more than just love; they need consistent love from a consistent
person or group of persons. See GOLDSTEIN Er AL., supra note 113, at 31-39. To the extent
children need to claim their own family, their sense of possession is important. See Hafen, supra
note 53, at 3 1.
119 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,638-39 (1979) ("[A]ffirmative sponsorship of ethical,
religious or political beliefs is something we expect the state not to attempt in a society
constitutionally committed to the ideal of individual liberty and freedom of choice.").
120 See Bartlett, supra note 83, at 890-93.
121 See Gilles, supra note 97, at 960; Bruce C. Hafen, The ConstitutionalStatus ofMarriage,
Kinship and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV.
463,480-82 (1983).
122 See Richard E. Behman & Linda Sandham Quirm, Children and Divorce: Overiew and
Analysis, FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring 1994, at4. These are 1990 statistics.
123 Not every child in a single or stepparent household must live with the ramifications of
positive parental rights because some non-custodial parents choose not to or cannot (because of
death or ignorance) interfere with their children's upbringing.
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child, the first parent can invoke the court's decisionmaking authority, under the
"best interest of the child" standard, 124 thereby, eviscerating the parental right to be
free from governmental interference and the presumption that a parent acts in his
child's best interest.
For instance, a parent's freedom to raise her children in the religious tradition
that she chooses is compromised if there is another parent who disagrees. 125 A
parent's right to inculcate values is comparably compromised if the other parent has
different values and asks the court to mediate.126 A single parent cannot decide how
much money should be spent on her children or what it should be spent on.127 She
also loses the ability to bring up her children in a community of her own
choosing. 128 In short, all of the parental rights elucidated above disappear once
124 The great majority of states use a best interest of the child standard to determine which
parent should have primary custody of the child. See CLARK, supra note 64, at 797. Even states
that do not use a best interest standard for initial custody determinations, see Pikula v. Pikula, 374
N.W.2d 705, 706 (Minn. 1985) (holding that primary custody is presumptively awarded to the
parent who has been the primary caregiver up to that point in time); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E2d
357, 358 (W. Va. 1981) (same), use the standard for ongoing modification of parental behavior.
See infra text accompanying notes 192-202.
125 See Mentry v. Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Kirchner v.
Cuaghey, 606 A.2d 257,264 (Md. 1992); Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606,611 (Mass. 1981);
Robert O. v. Judy E., 395 N.Y.S.2d 351,352 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1977); Madagan v. Klein, 473 S.E2d
778,787 (N.C. 1996); Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P2d 1133,1136 (Wash. 1971). Cf Morris v. Morris,
412 A.2d 139, 147 (Pa. 1979).
126 See Jarrett v. Jarett, 400 N.E.2d 421,427 (111. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1990)
(holding that the cohabitating mother loses custody because she would not marry her new sexual
partner); GA. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (denying lesbian mother
custody because of her lesbianism).
127 See Peterson v. Peterson, 434 N.W.2d 732, 738 (S.D. 1989) (holding that the court is to
determine the 'realistic needs of the children and the obligor's ability to satisfy these requisites"
and, if income is over a certain amount, the court is to decide the "appropriate level" of
contribution); see also In re Marriage of Bush, 547 N.E.2d 590, 596 (11. 1989). Both of those
cases involved families with "excess income," that is, families in which the father's income was
great enough that the court felt that it did not need to award the child as much of a percentage of
the father's income as the statutory child support guidelines would suggest. The mothers were
arguing that more of the father's income should be spent on the children. If children are living at
the other end of the economic scale, the state can require mothers to participate in trying to get the
biological father to pay support, regardless of whether the mothers want to try to receive income
from their children's father. See David Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare Sstem and the Virtues and
Perils of Child Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575, 2602-03 (1995). States require
paternal notification notwithstanding findings that 43% of never married mothers and 42% of
divorced mothers do not want a collection order issued. See ANDREA BELIER & JOHN GRAHAM,
THE ECONOICS OF CHILD SUPPORT 20-21 (1993).
128 See Fingert v. Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 390-91 (1990) (recounting previous lower
court ruling that prevented primary custodian from moving from California to Chicago where she
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another person with parental status invokes the state's authority.
Note the effect this evisceration ofnegative liberty has on the adult benefits of
vertical relationships. Parenting one's children cannot be a way in which to "fulfill
and express [one's] deepest values about how life is to be lived 1 29 if one is not free
to rear children with the values that form the essence of one's sense of human
flourishing. When parental obligations are dictated by the state, the acceptance of
child rearing responsibility ceases to be a form of self-expression. The intimacy of
day to day contact that enables a knowledge and love of one's children and
engenders an embracing of self-sacrifice is minimized if one is parenting according
to court order or if one is reduced to biweekly and holiday visits. 130
Positive parental rights also erode the benefits that children receive from
vertical privacy protection. Children cannot learn a coherent value structure if they
are subject to competing value systems.131 Multiple vertical bonds that permit
children to maintain relationships with many parent-like figures may serve the
children's need for ongoing relationships,' 32 but they do so at the expense of a sense
of belonging to one group. The more the court interferes, the less the child belongs
had an opportunity to take over her father's business); Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 418 S.E.2d 675,
680 (N.C. Ct App. 1992) (holding that primary custodian could not move from Chapel Hill, North
Carolina to California so that she and the child could be close to her relatives); In re Marriage of
Sheley, 895 P.2d 850, 856 (Wash. CL App. 1995) (restricting custodial mother from moving out
of the Seattle area).
129 Richards, supra note 101, at 28.
130 Only approximately one quarter of children in single parent households see their father
as often as once a week. See Judith Seltzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Nho Live
Apart: The Father's Role After Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 79, 86 (1991), cited in
Chambers, supra note 127, at 2600.
131 In their study of 1100 divorced couples with minor children in California, Eleanor
Maccoby and Robert Mnookin found that only one quarter of the divorced parents were able to
cooperate effectively on child-related decisions. A substantial group of the parents openly fought
over these decisions and tried to undernine the other parent's decisions. Another common strategy
was to disengage from the other parent in order to avoid contact and open contrast, but to leave the
child coping with inconsistent parental decisionmaking. See ELEANOR E. MACcoBY & ROBERT
H. MNooKiN, DIviDNG THE CHmD 247 (1992).
132 Courts, legislatures, and commentators now routinely endorse awarding visitation
privileges to non-parents. See Hughes v. Banning, 541 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989)
(granting visitation rights to stepmother); KR. v. K.R., 537 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Iowa 1995)
(granting visitation rights to grandparents); Guma v. Guma, 518 N.Y.S.2d 19,20 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987) (granting grandparents the right to intervene in custody action); see also 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/607 (West 1993) (codifying visitation rights); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.09.240(1) (West 1997) (same). See generally Bartlett, supra note 9 (suggesting that legal
notions of parenthood should be directed away from parental possessiveness and self-
centeredness); Naomi R. Cahn, Refraining Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OIo ST. L. 1
(1997) (advocating the designation of many adults as "parents").
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to one unit. With a "waning sense of belonging"133 comes increased difficulty in
becoming an autonomous adult. If one needs a solid sense of whence one is from
before one can define oneself, than a diffuse (even if rich) combination of vertical
relationships may do children a disservice. As one researcher concluded,
[a]s a consequence of divided parental authority and lack of respect given to one
another, [divorced] parenting tends to become more problematic: discipline is more
coercive, and expectations are more inconsistent, all of which are predictive of
more negative and distant parent-child relationships and increase in children's
emotional and behavioral problems. 134
Multiple vertical relationships do not necessarily do children a disservice.
Others argue that the constancy of various relationships is more important than
rooting a child in any one particular relationship. 135 The fact is that we simply do
not know the relative benefits of many different and diffuse relationships versus a
few constant and stable relationships. 136 And these are mutually exclusive
alternatives. The more people with a "claim" to a vertical relationship with the child,
the less stable the child's life will be because more lives are necessarily less stable
than fewer lives. Moreover, the justification of state deference to the parent-child
relationship rests on the notion that parents deserve and children need the stability
of a primary relationship through which values can be expressed and inculcated and
in which parents invest enough to make them the best arbiter of what is in the
child's welfare. If non-married parents do not deserve and children of divorce or
separation do not need such a primary relationship, then state deference to vertical
relationships cannot be justified for traditional nuclear families either. As it has
emerged to date, the law affords negative parental rights to married parents because
the primary parent-child relationship is so important to both parent and child, but
the law ignores the importance of that primary relationship once parents are
133 Hafen, supra note 53, at 1.
134 Janet R. Johnston, High-Conflict Divorce, in FUrURE CHILDREN, Spring 1994, at 172.
13 5 See Bartlett, supra note 9; Calm, supra note 132. Many cultures, for example the African-
American community in this country and the Kibbutz communities of Israel, rely on multiple
vertical relationships to do the work of child rearing, see MENACHEM GERSON, FAMILY, WOMEN
AND SOCIALiZATION IN THE KIBBTZ 48-57, 71-75 (1978) (regarding the Kibbutz community);
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 209, 270-72 (1995) (regarding the
African-American community), but there is a significant difference between consensual multiple
vertical relationships and forced multiple vertical relationships. Evidence suggests that when courts
force a parent to accept another vertical relationship into the child's life, the stress created by that
force does the child a disservice. See infra text accompanying notes 203-07.
136 As Lee Teitelbaum has pointed out elsewhere, attempts to prove which child rearing
practices are "best' are futile because multiple causation problems make reliable empirical studies
of family life almost impossible to design. See Teitelbaum, supra note 57, at 437.
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divorced or if they were never married.137
C. Summary
To this point we have explored two different kinds of intimate relationships,
one horizontal, the other vertical, both of which enjoy legal protection. We have
seen that just as the legal protection of marriage cannot be defended as it once
was---as a means of protecting a person's property right by securing his right to
control another-and, instead, must be defended on expressive, spiritual, and self-
enrichment grounds, so the legal protection of parenthood cannot be defended, as
it is often thought to be, as a means of protecting one's right to control one's genetic
output. The justification for legal protection of parenthood, like the justification for
the legal protection of marriage, is rooted in the expressive, spiritual, and enriching
nature of self-defining relationships. Thus, for the most part, the justification for
legal protection of intimacy is the same in both the horizontal and vertical context.
Intimate relationships deserve legal protection because of the self-constitutive role
they fill for individuals. They are self-constitutive for adults because of their
expressive, moral, and integrative functions and because of their ability to help
adults achieve autonomy. Intimate relationships are self-constitutive for children in
an even more concrete way. They provide children with a loving, value-laden
community with which, and through which, children can grow into responsible,
loving adults. The government's deference to these relationships is critical to the
relationships' value because too much external regulation destroys the essence of
the boundaried, internally solidified bond that defines intimacy. The next Part
explores how, notwithstanding the analysis above, the benefits and burdens of
governmental interference with both horizontal and vertical relationships are
gendered.
III. GENDER AND THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF RELATIONSHIP
A. Horizontal Relationships and Gender
Men and women are different.138 Why this is so is the subject of tremendous
137 Arguably, the law does this because once parents are divorced or if they were never
married, there is no one primary relationship. There are two primary relationships with two
different parents. For the great majority of children of divorce or never married parents, however,
this is simply an inaccurate assumption. There is usually only one custodial parent who is the
primary caretaker and, in all but the biological sense, the primary parent. See infra notes 216-20
and accompanying text.
138 Because this Article is not the place to explore the important differences between sex and
gender, see generally Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE LU. I (1995);
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debate, but whether one roots gender difference in biology,139 psychology,140
sociology,141 political power,142 or some combination of all of these forces, 143
empirical research clearly establishes recurring differences in the way men and
women see people,144 value others, 145 relay information, 146 and render justice.' 47
The most important differences for family law are men's and women's differing
Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989), I am using the terms
"women" and "men" interchangeably with the notion of females and males who have been raised
and live in our current gender system. Whether the documented differences between females and
males would exist with the frequency that they do in a gender system very different than our own
is a question well beyond the scope of this Article.
139 See generally RUTH BLER, SCIENCE AND GENDER (1984) (discussing how biological
science is and has been used to subordinate women).
140 See generally NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCION OF MOTHERING (1978)
(discussing how mothering in Western society produces unequal gender relations).
141 See generally SIMONE DE BEAUvOiR, TIM SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans.,
Alfred A. Knopf 1953) (1949) ('Women are not bom they are made.").
14 2 See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance, in FEMINIsM
UNMODFID 32,37 (1987) (explaining "that hierarchy ofpower produces real as well as fantasied
differences"); Williams, supra note 138, at 801 (arguing that work and family responsibilities "are
at the core of the contemporary gender system, which systematically enriches men at the expense
of women and children").
143 Most feminists, including the ones just cited, probably fall best into this category. See,
e.g., ALISON M. JAGGER, FEMINIST POLrICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyers Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 39, 39-40 (1985); Robin West, Jurprudence andGender, 55 U. CI. L. REV. 1
(1988). Whether or not one agrees that women and men are inevitably different, the theoretical and
empirical research strongly suggest, and I will assume, that there are gender differences. See
CHODOROW, supra note 140; CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); MACKINNON,
supra note 142; JEAN BAKER MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (2d ed. 1986);
NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A FMININE APPROACH TO ETICs AND MORAL EDUCAnON (1984);
BLEIER, supra note 139; Williams, supra note 138.
144 Suzanna Sherry, summarizing the work of Nancy Chodorow and Carol Gilligan writes,
"the feminine perspective views individuals primarily as interconnected members of a
community.... Women thus tend to see others as extensions of themselves rather than as
outsiders or competitors." Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 584-85 (1986).
145 "The moral imperative... [for] women is an injunction to care .... For men, the moral
imperative appears rather as an injunction to respect the rights of others." GILLIGAN, supra note
143, at 100.
14 6 See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'TUNDERSTAND 91 (1990) (explaining
that women tend to use "personal experience and examples rather than abstract argumentation"
to explain or understand their concept of truth).
147 See GILLIGAN, supra note 143, at 25-31, for the now famous example ofJake and Amy's
different approaches to the Heinz dilemma.
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experiences with intimacy, selflessness, justice, and autonomy.
In Part HA, we saw that relationships, like marriage, contribute so powerfully
to people's happiness because marriage is one of the very few arenas in which
people are able to experience and express an expanded sense of self-a sense of self
that is fundamentally intertwined with someone else. Marriage allows one to be in
the world not just as an independent being, but as part of a unit, and, therefore, it is
important for the law to protect that unit as a unit.
Protecting or encouraging these units seems largely unnecessary for many
women, however. Women create unities with others all the time. As Carrie Menkel-
Meadow summarizes, "[t]he common theme that unites [the] body of work by
psychologists such as Chodorow, Dimnnerstein, Miller, Schaef and [ ] Gilligan, is that
women experience themselves through connections and relationships to others
while men see themselves as separately identified individuals."148 Although radical
and cultural feminists disagree about the desirability of this female fusion of
intimacy and identity, both groups acknowledge its applicability. 149 Gilligan's
subjects, whether they were in horizontal relationships or not, defined their identity
"in the context of relationship. ' 150 Without any privacy veils to encourage their
investment in relationship, many women already are bonded, connected, and
intimate with much of the world around them.151
Thus, marriage is not the institution through which women experience
connection, and many women do not experience a kind of unique transcendent self
when they bond with another individual in marriage. Bonding, blending themselves
with others, is what many women do all the time. It is the primary way they come
to know themselves. Accordingly, for many women, there is less need to privilege
the marriage bond as essential to a unique form of self-expression because marriage
is just one intimate bond among many for women.
Moreover, as some of the radical feminist arguments suggest, there may be a
real need to protect women from marriage's tendency to over-emphasize intimacy.
14 8 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 143, at 43.
14 9 Catherine MacKinnon calls the Gilligan findings with regard to women and relationships
"accurate social regularities." Catharine MacKinnon, The 1984 James McCormick Mitchell
Lecture: Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BuFF. L. REV. 11,
73 (1985). West argues that both radical and cultural feminists "adhere to some version" of the
"connection thesis" West, supra note 143, at 14-15. The differences lie in the extent to which this
connection should be celebrated. "Cultural feminists... have reidentified these differences [with
regard to intimacy] as women's strengths rather than women's weaknesses." Id at 18. Whereas,
"to radical feminism, women's connection to others is the source of women's misery... ?: Id. at
29.
150 GILLIGAN, supra note 143, at 160.
151 Joan Williams rejects the notion "that women are [necessarily] focused on relationships
while men are not." Williams, supra note 138, at 802. However, she acknowledges that women
are much more likely than are men to prioritize relationships. See id. at 830-31.
1998] 1551
OHIO STATE LAWJOURIVAL
Robin West explains, "[f]or radical feminists, [the] potential for connection-
experienced materially in intercourse and pregnancy, but experienced existentially
in all spheres of life-is the source of women's debasement, powerlessness,
subjugation, and misery."1 52 The kind of self-expression and wholeness that many
women need help with is not the wholeness that comes from bonding with another;,
it is the kind wholeness that comes from recognizing that one does not need to be
bonded with, responsible for, or dependent on anyone.153 Many women do not need
more interdependence to express themselves; they need, as Virginia Woolf wrote
towards the beginning of this century "a room of [their] own"154 -where they are
free not to worry about how they intertwine with everyone else. As West writes:
[W]omen's longings for individuation, physical privacy, and independence go well
beyond the desire to avoid the dangers of rape or unwanted pregnancy....
Women ... long for... the freedom, the independence, the individuality, the sense
of wholeness, the confidence, the self-esteem, and the security of identity which can
only come from a life, a history, a path, a voice, a sexuality, a womb, and a body
of one's own.155
Consciously or not, the male justifications 156 for protecting horizontal intimacy
that were explored in Part II.A parallel what West describes as the critical legal
152 West, supra note 143, at 29. This Part relies heavily on West's extensive critique of
liberal theory, critical legal theory, cultural feminism, and radical feminism. The reliance is well-
deserved. As Professor Chris Littleton stated, West's Jurisprudence and Gender was "paradigm-
shifting." Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives
on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 23, 31. Nonetheless, as Joan Williams
explains, in relying in part on biological determinism to explain women's connection, West may
be confusing biology with metaphor. See Williams, supra note 138, at 800-01 n.11. Women who
have never been pregnant still behave in ways that demonstrate the connection thesis. Intercourse
is not necessarily more of an experience of connection for women than it is for men. For purposes
of this Article, it does not matter whether West's theory of connection is rooted in biology or
metaphor. Ifit is an accurate description of the ways in which men and women, as they exist in our
society, are different, (a proposition that Williams does not deny) then it must be accounted for in
law.
153 Consider the comments of cne of the divorced women in Catherine Reissman's study of
the effects of divorce on men and women: 'Trying to be my own person, well, it's scary.... [But]
[t]here's a certain kind of exhilaration in taking yourself seriously, thinking about yourself as an
entity, trying to be whole unto yourself." CAT-ERINE KOHLER REisSMAN, DIVORCE TALK 179-80
(1990). Cf. Olsen, The Family and TheMarket, supra note 22, at 1565 (' Byrelating with women
in families, men try to reclaim wholeness.").
154 VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OwN (1929).
155 West, supra note 143, at 35.
1561 call them male justifications because: (1) they were explained by men and (2) they seem
to be describing the masculine position. I do not mean to suggest that all men agree with them.
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theorist account of human nature. "According to critical legal theory, we are indeed
physically separate from the other, but what that existentially entails is that we dread
the alienation and isolation from the separate other, and long for connection with
him." 157 It is that connection, albeit within the parameters of a pre-defined
institution of marriage, that Regan, Hafen, Schneider, and Karst158 want to celebrate
and privilege. This may not be what women need at all, however.
The marital roles that Regan celebrates as allowing us the opportunity to "root
the self in context" and that Schneider praises for their efficient and integrative
function may be oppressive for women. Rooting oneself in context is of limited
value if the context is of limited (or negative) value.159 Men may want the law to
protect and solidify their interdependent relationships, but women may want the law
to enable them to experience independence. 160 Women may want the opportunity
to abandon their historical roles as providers of intimacy.161
The opportunity to be less intimate would afford women the opportunity to be
less selfless. The intimacy and connection that leads one to dive in after one's
drowning child is surely a good thing in the abstract but why is it that women are
always the ones diving in?162 If "[c]aring, nurturance, and an ethic of love and
responsibility for life is second nature" for women,163 they may not need
institutions to foster those qualities in them. As Margaret Radin has explained,
157 West, supra note 143, at 12.
158 Karst did not necessarily endorse the institution of marriage, but he did argue for
privileging horizontal intimate relationships. See Karst, supra note 36.
159 1 cannot resist revisiting Professor Schneider's tennis analogy. See supra note 47, at 511.
The following story is true. I grew up the only girl in a family with two older brothers who
frequently played tennis. I played too, but my role was ball-girl. This meant I ran across the court
to pick up badly hit balls and, after retrieving then, dutifully threw them to the next person
serving. This role made sense for me. I was not as good as my brothers at hitting the ball over the
net, nor did I feel that it was my right to hit the ball over the net. Still, I wanted to play with them,
to be connected to them, and to have them be connected to me. They wanted me to feel a part of
their game too. By making me ball-girl we could all feel fulfilled. With everyone in their proper
roles, we could play and be happy together. Nonetheless, many women, if given the opportunity,
may now aspire to be more than ball-girls.
160 Again, consider several ofReissman's subjects: "[J]ust the pride of being able to handle
everything[,] ... I feel good about myself." REISSMAN, supra note 153, at 169. '1 feel much more
secure, independently [sic] of him .... "Id at 172.
161 To paraphrase a popular t-shirt from the early 1970s, "Intimacy is not Destiny."
1627Te average American woman spends 111/2 years of her working life caring for children
or dependent others. The average man spends six months. See Tamar Lewin, Aging Parents:
Women "s Burden Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,1989, at A 1; see also ARLIE HOCHsCHIrD & ANNE
MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFr 3 (1989) (concluding that women working outside the home work
approximately one full month a year more than their spouses).
163 West, supra note 143, at 18.
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celebrating the "ethic of care" that women feel may be "an artifact of coping with
oppression."1 64 If protecting horizontal relationships encourages the participants to
be more selfless than they otherwise would be, there is a strong argument against
women entering into such relationships. The increased selflessness for women
might lead to the elimination of self. Someone needs to jump in after the drowning
child, but by assigning that role to women, our system of gender affords men the
freedom to develop themselves as individuals without constantly worrying about
who is drowning. 165 When men do dive in they may feel "liberated" by finding
selflessness in themselves, 166 but they may be in far less danger of losing their
selves in the first place.
Comparably, the alternative sense of justice that governs horizontal
relationships may be the last thing women need in order to become whole. As
explained above, horizontal relationships depend on trust and forgiveness and faith
in the future. These qualities come more easily to people for whom intimacy is
second nature, but they are qualities that can do more harm than good. As Susan
Moller Okmn suggests in her critique ofjustice and the family, "[t]o substitute self-
sacrifice and altruism for justice in the context of a unity that may dissolve before
one's very eyes, without one's consent and to the detriment of those one cares most
about, would perhaps be better labeled lack of foresight than nobility."'167 The
experience of many battered women suggests that women have been far too willing
to trust, forgive, and have faith in men who, by almost any standard, do not deserve
it.168 Indeed, it is women's willingness to stay in a relationship, to live with that
alternative sense ofjustice that relies on conciliation and hope rather than abstract
principle, that has kept women in battering relationships. 169 Whether or not one
believes in the theory or utility of the Battered Women's Syndrome, its very
existence suggests that, for women, "the exits [from relationship] are not clearly
marked." 170 Women may need the law to provide much bigger exit signs. That
164 Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699,1717-
18 (1990).
165 Joan Williams speaks about this problem in the context of women subordinating their
careers for the sake of the family. "Women know that if they do not sacrifice no one will, whereas
men assume that if they do not, women will." Williams, supra note 138, at 831 (emphasis added).
166 This was Bruce Hafen's argument. See Hafen, supra note 53, at 41 and accompanying
text.
167 SusAN MOLLER OKIN, JusTIcE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 32-33 (1989).
168 For a general account of the pervasiveness of domestic violence, see Joan Zorza, The
Criminal Law ofMisdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
46 (1992); see also LENOREE. WALKER, TBEBATrERED WOMAN (1979).
169 See Littleton, supra note 152, at 43-47 ("[W]omen [may] value connection enough to
keep trying despite marginally greater risks of harm.").
170 As mentioned previously, Kenneth Karst suggests that formal systems ofjustice and state
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courts routinely dismissed claims by battered women1 71 suggests that the courts
understood neither the interdependency of intimacy or women's particular need to
be free of it.
As Lee Teitelbaum explains, when we respect the alternative sense ofjustice
within horizontal relationships by not introducing abstract principles and rights "the
practical consequence... is to confer or ratify the power of one family member
over others. ' 172 In the context of many inter-relationship disputes, from domestic
violence to divisions of labor within the family,173 this "alternative" system of
justice seems particularly unjust for women because it prevents them from invoking
external and rights-based theories in support of their own position. As suggested
above, abstract legal principles and the rights that threaten relationship can do the
less-empowered a world of good. 174
Intimacy is work. Women may do that work more naturally than men do,175 but
that does not mean it should go uncompensated. Foregoing one's own needs,
evaluating each context and feeling responsible for others takes energy, time, and
intelligence. It may not be the kind of energy, investment or intelligence that has
commanded respect traditionally in our culture, but many men come to rely on the
fact that women do it. Consider the correlation between women's economic
independence and marital discord. Women who are contributing economically have
less time to do the work of intimacy. When wives work, spousal interaction
decreases, resulting in increased marital disagreement and reduced marital
happiness. 176 The more economically independent women are, the higher their
interference with relationship are inappropriate because for people who "want out;" "the exit signs
are clearly marked." See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. For a thorough discussion of
the Battered Women's Syndrome, see generally Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-
Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Refbrm Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991 ).
17 1 See R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSEL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE, 199-209 (1992); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMENAND MALE VIOLENCE 210-16 (1982).
172 Teitelbaun, supra note 61, at 1174.
173 Numerous studies documenting how partners allocate domestic chores indicate that
women do vastly more caretaking and other domestic work than do men. For a summary ofthese
studies, see HOCHSCHIID & MACHUNG, supra note 162, at 271-78. Hochschild and Machung
conclude that women who work outside the home work approximately one full month (or twenty-
four days) a year more than their wage-earning spouse. See id at 3.
174 See Minow, supra note 9, at 1873-82.
175 See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 154 (1992) ("Caretaking is done by women most of the time in most
families."); FINEMAN, supra note 29, at 162 ("[I]ntimacy and its maintenance have always been
and continue to be disproportionately allocated to women.").
176 See Alan Booth et al., Women, Outside Employment, and Marital Instability, 90 AMER.
J. SOC. 567,567-87 (1984).
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divorce rate.177 When women cannot accommodate themselves to their husband's
schedules or cannot muster energy to provide a haven from a heartless world,
marriages falter. Thus, intimacy is not only work, it is work that appears critically
important to keeping a marriage together.178
By allowing horizontal relationships to be governed by an alternative sense of
justice, we rob women of the opportunity to appeal to more traditional and
masculine senses of justice that determine fairness based on traditional theories of
desert, most obviously the labor they perform. 179 To invoke Carol Gilligan's now
famous subjects, if Amy were free to rely more on the logic ofjustice than the ethic
of care, Jake might have to respect the work of intimacy that Amy does. This might
make Jake much less likely to take advantage of Amy and much more likely to stay
home with a sick child, wash the dishes, and invest time nurturing others. And Amy
might be able to spend more time "in a room of her own."
Thus, the values associated with privileged horizontal relationships are values
that many women already have, but that men may need.180 The values associated
with individualism and autonomy are values that many men already have, but that
women may need. It follows, therefore, that the benefits associated with marriage
may well inure disproportionately to men because, although marriage can serve the
expressive and constitutive functions for women, marriage is just one of many
relationships through which women identify themselves and in which they work out
unique forms of interdependence. It is not that marriage has no expressive or moral
value for women, it is just that it does not have such unique value for women.
What marriage often does provide for women is economic sustenance. Women
provide for themselves by providing intimacy for others. The justification for state
deference to marriage explicated in Part II.A may be based on the spiritual
interdependence resulting from the blending of two personalities, but the economics
of the situation indicate a more concrete and rather troubling exchange theory of
interdependence. Men pay their spouses for the intimacy that women provide.181
177 See IRWIN GARFINKEL& SARA S. MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN
66-67 (1986).
17 8 Of course, women's participation in the workforce also may be positively correlated to
divorce because women who earn wages outside the home are less in need of their husbands'
support. If it is economic freedom that leads to marital discord, however, it would appear that the
interdependence hailed in Part II.A as a self-realizing justification for marriage seems less a matter
of choice than conscription for some women.
179 As Carol Rose notes, "when we see the unspoken property within arrangements that
masquerade as 'sharing,' we can also see their injustice ... ." Rose, supra note 4, at 2415.
180 See Olsen, The Family and The Market, supra note 22, at 1565 ("[Tlhe family is a realm
in which [men] can expose their 'weaknesses,' in which they may embrace without shame the
values traditionally associated with women.).
181 Husbands earn substantially more than their wives do. Among full-time workers, married
men earn 124% more than married women do. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DFP'T OF
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This an-angement hurts women in two ways. First, at divorce, the law is notoriously
bad at capturing the value that the work of intimacy provided to the union.182
Second, because women will likely not be compensated at divorce for the intimacy
that they have provided, women have a very large incentive to stay married.
Divorce, however beneficial it might be for women physically or emotionally,, 83
is an economic disaster for women.184 By refusing to interfere with marital relations
and by failing to capture the financial value of intimacy, the law fosters the
interdependence that enhances some men's sense of wholeness, but stunts many
women's growth.
Thus, the primary advantages that privileging the marital bond hold for men are
relatively less important for women because the expressive and constituent roles
that marriage serves for men are relatively less important for women, who have
other relationships that serve this purpose. The haven from a heartless world that the
COMMERCF, SEE. P-60, No. 180, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMmS, AND PERSONS IN
THEUNrrED STATES: 1991, at 112, 114 (1991). It is well established that women's earnings decline
when they get married, while men's increase. See VICrOR R FucHs, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR
ECONOMIC EQuALriY 58-64 (1988).
182 Although numerous eminent scholars have tried to articulate a satisfactory theory of
alimony, see Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing FinancialInterests on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM
AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 73, at 130; Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory ofAlimony, 77 CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1989); Regan, Spouses and Straingers, supra note 37, the task seems to have eluded us so
far. It is incredibly difficult to capture, in financial terms, the value that intimacy provides.
183 Levels of depression in women are closely correlated to their satisfaction with their
marriages. An expert panel of the American Psychological Association found that '"[a]n unhappy
or tension-filled marriage makes women three times more likely to get depressed than it does men
in similar relationships."' Daniel Goleman, Women's Depression Rate is Higher, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
6, 1990, at B18 (quoting Dr. Ellen McGrath). One researcher from that study found that working
outside the home helped alleviate some women's depression. See Julia Lawlor, Goodbye to the
Job. Hello to the Shock, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, § 3 (Money & Business), at 11 ("I[S]tay-at-
home wives with troubled marriages were the most depressed, followed by employed wives with
troubled marriages and tension-filled jobs. Stay-at-home wives with happy marriages had
relatively low levels of depression, but least depressed were employed wives with happy
marriages .... "). Reissman concluded that women benefit psychologically from the "public
manifestations of independence" brought about by divorce. See REISSMAN, supra note 153, at 177.
184 White women experience a 20% to 26% drop in their standard of living after divorce.
African-American women experience a 28% to 31% drop. White men's standard of living, on the
other hand, was found to rise between 26% to 44% after divorce, and African-American men's
standard of living rose 22% to 35%. See Annemette Sorenson, Estimating the Economic
Consequences of Separation and Divorce: A Cautionary Tale from the United States, in
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE 278-79 (Lenore J. Weitzman & Mavis Maclean eds.,
1992). Other evidence suggests that the harmful effects of divorce decline somewhat over time,
as women remarry, but women who stay single rarely recapture their pre-divorce standard of
living. See Greg Duncan & Saul Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic Consequences of
Marital Dissolution, in DEMOGRAPHY 485,490 (1985).
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family provides for men can easily trap women in systems ofjustice in which their
work is disproportionately extracted, but undervalued. Too much emphasis on
interdependence in a marriage fosters financial vulnerability in women and impedes
women's ability to express themselves as independent actors. For all of these
reasons, it appears that the primary beneficiaries of the law's respect for the marital
boundary are men.
B. Vertical Relationships and Gender
As we saw in Part II.B, the law does not treat all vertical relationships as
boundaried entities into which it should not enter; it privileges only those vertical
relationships that are supported by horizontal relationships. A single parent has
little, if any, right to be free from state intervention with her vertical relationship. If
she enjoys that freedom, it is only because the other parent chooses not to invoke the
state's power. My use of the female pronoun here is intentional. The great majority
of primary caretakers of children are women. 185 Thus, the adults most likely to be
hurt by state interference with the vertical relationship are women.
Applying some of the insights from Part LIA above, one might argue that this
state interference is not detrimental for women because, as analyzed, women are
less in need of privileged relationships because they are so ontologically connected
to others. A female caretaker will experience the expressive, selfless, and
connectedness values associated with her relationship with her child regardless of
what the state does. The problem with state interference with vertical relationships,
however, is not so much that it destroys the benefits of intimacy for the caretaker,
but that the state interference does little good for the child and ties the caretaker to
a horizontal relationship-with the father-that she often no longer wants, needs,
or deserves. This Part explores how state interference into vertical relationships is
unnecessary for children, and once again, privileges men's desire for potential
connection at the expense of women's need for autonomy. As explained below,
neither the children's interests nor the non-custodial parents' interests justify the
restrictions that courts routinely impose on single mothers' autonomy.18 6
1. The Child's Interest in State Interference
Arguably, negative parental rights should only be afforded in those instances
185 See BUREAU OF TBE CENsUs, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 14, at 66 (reporting
that 87% of single parents are women).
186 All relationships restrict our autonomy somewhat. Good relationships both restrict and
enhance our autonomy, however, by providing something positive through which we come to
understand ourselves as other. Relationships that cease to be supportive cease to provide this
positive source of self-definition and serve only as a restriction on our thought and action.
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in which vertical relationships are supported by horizontal relationships because it
is only in those family situations that we are confident that the parents will actually
do the bestjob of raising the children. Evidence supports the notion that children do
best in a household with two married parents. 187 There is no evidence, however, that
the state's intrusion into single parent households gets the job done any better. 188
The needs that children have for non-neutral, value-laden belief systems and
consistent stable, loving relationships are necessarily jeopardized by more state
interference. 189 Nonetheless, the willingness of the state to interfere with parenting
decisions has grown in the last twenty-five years, in no small part because of the
acceptance of psychological parenting theory190 and its concurrent premise that a
neutral arbiter can determine the best parent in any given situation.191 The standard
routinely used by that neutral arbiter is the best interest of the child.
Few legal standards have encountered as much criticism in as short a time as
has the best interest of the child standard.192 Robert Mnookin attacks the standard
for failing to provide a set of values that a judge can use as a guide and for
pretending that we can accurately predict what will be in a child's long-term
interests. 193 David Chambers assails the inevitable paternalism of the standard. It
is not "possible to develop a state-prescribed view of children's interests that does
not mindlessly refer to the majority's (or the judge's) preferences." 194 Mary Ann
187 See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DivIDED FAMLiEs 68-70
(1991). Children from divorced households are more than 50% more likely to have long-term
behavioral problems than children from married hmuseholds although, as the authors note, 66%
of children from divorced households had no such behavioral trouble. Moreover, there are serious
control sample problems. We do not know what would have happened to children of divorce if
they had instead been children of distressed marriages. As a legal matter, it is the divorce, not the
distress, that justifies state interference on behalf of the children. See id.
188 As Justice Brandeis warned in Olmsteadv. United States, "[e]xperience should teach us
to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purpose is beneficent"
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 106-18.
190 This is the theory developed in Freud, Goldstein, and Solnit's Beyond the Best Interest
of the Child. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 113.
191 See Martin Guggenhein, The Political and Legal Implications of the Psychological
Parenting Theory, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 549,551-52 (1983-1984).
192 For a summary of the major critiques of the standard, see Carl E. Schneider, Discretion,
Rules andLaw. Child Custody and the UMDA 's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 2215,
2219-26 (1991); see also Becker, supra note 175, at 172-83.
193 See Robert Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 258-61.
194 David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules ofCustody Disputes in Divorce, 83
MICH. L. REV. 477,491 (1984). This problem can be particularly acute in a time when we are no
longer comfortable wvith objective standards of good parenting. See Teitelbaum, supra note 57, at
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Glendon argues that the standard's indeterminacy increases litigation and the
attendant problems (particularly for children) with lengthy custody disputes. 1 95 Jon
Elster objects to preferencing the child's needs because, even if courts were capable
of determining those needs, preferencing them unfairly neglects the needs and
entitlements of the parents involved. 96 Martha Fineman demonstrates how the best
interest of the child standard lets medical and social service professionals usurp the
role that mothers once played in determining what is in the child's interest.197
Similarly, judges themselves recognize the problems with assuming that the
state can make appropriate decisions under the best interest of the child standard.
The first state supreme court to reject the best interest standard for custody
determinations acknowledged that "in the average divorce proceeding intelligent
determination of relative degrees of fitness requires a precision of measurement
which is not possible given the tools available to judges."198 Concurring in a rare
federal decision involving the standard, a perplexed Judge Brown asked, "[o]n what
do we draw in making these choices? Are we, as Federal Judges, endowed with
sufficient prescience to decide such delicate issues? We should remind ourselves
that we do not possess the wisdom of Solomon .... " 199
When courts ostensibly rely on the best interest standard, they often evaluate
the adults' status and behavior, not parenting ability. Courts routinely penalize
parents for behavior that the court finds objectionable, regardless of whether that
behavior has been demonstrated to have a negative impact on the child. Thus, the
fact that a custodial parent strayed from the terms of a custody agreement after
changing her mind about the lifestyle and religion with which her children should
be reared was sufficient cause for taking away her custody rights; the court did not
431.
195 See Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contempory Family Law and
Succession Law, 60 TbL. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1986).
196 See Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CfH.
L. REv. 1, 16-20 (1987).
197 See Martha L. Fineman, The Polities of Custody and the Transformation ofAmerican
Custody, 22 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 829, 846 (1989). This problem is probably most famously
depicted in the case ofPainter v. Bannister, in which matemal grandparents were awarded custody
over the biological father after the grandparents produced an expert psychologist who testified that
the child's best interest would be served by awarding custody to the grandparents. The father was
unable to afford an expert. See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 158 (iowa 1966). The Iowa
Supreme Court found that it had no choice but to accept the uncontradicted evidence from the
grandparents' expert and awarded custody to the grandparents. See id. The biological mother, who
died in a car accident, had specifically requested that the father retain custody. See id.
198 Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357,361 (W. Va. 1981).
199 Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family & Children's Serv., 563 F.2d 1200, 1212
(5th Cir. 1977). Judge Brown did not con-ment on how the state court judges who routinely make
these decisions come upon their prescient wisdom or solomonicjudgement.
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evaluate whether the children were negatively affected by her behavior.200 In an
emerging body of case law, courts are awarding custody to non-biological parents
who have psychological relationships with the children; however, they will do so
only if the biological parent misled the non-biological parent into believing that he
was the biological parent.20 1 The concern is not whether the child is actually best
served by the custody award, but whether the parent who seeks custody deserves it.
That courts do not routinely award custody to the parent in the "nicer" or "more
natural" home suggests that courts implicitly recognize that the parental desert, not
just a child's interest, plays a significant role in custody detenninations. 20 2
The fact that courts make custodial and child rearing decisions based on factors
other than the child's best interest undermines the argument that we need state
interference with vertical relationships in order to help single parents make better
child rearing decisions. Courts do not know how to make child rearing decisions.
They do not like making child rearing decisions and, in response, even when they
are supposed to, courts often do not make child rearing decisions. Instead, they
allow the child rearing decision to be made as a byproduct of ajudicial evaluation
of the adults' behavior.
Our willingness to accept state interference into vertical relationships should
also be tempered by the recognition that children are the clear losers in ongoing
court battles. Contact with more than one parent is good for the child only if that
contact is achieved without creating tension or stress in the custodial household.2 03
The most important determiner of children's mental health after divorce is the
anxiety level of the custodial parent.204 Children of parents who have a highly
conflictual relationship after divorce are two to four times more likely to be
clinically disturbed.205
Many non-married parents can share their vertical relationships without so
much stress, but by providing the court with the authority to act as arbiter, we
exacerbate the problems for those parents who cannot work it out on their own.2 0 6
200 See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1982).
201 See In re Roberts, 649 N.E.2d 1344 (Ill. 1995); Price v. Howard, 484 S.E.2d 528, 537
(N.C. 1997); D.G. v. D.M.K, 557 N.W.2d 235,242 (S.D. 1996).
202 See Chambers, supra note 194, at 500 (stating that depriving custody to a parent who is
less wealthy or slightly less conforming than the other parent seems less fair).
203 See FtJRSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 187, at 106-07 (explaining that increased
contact with the non-custodial parent is good, all else being equal, but if the increased contact
increases the stress level of the custodial parent, all else is not equal); see also Chambers, supra
note 127, at 2601 (explaining that conflict created by increased parental contribution may not be
worth the benefit).
204 See FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 187, at 75.
205 See Johnston, supra note 134, at 175.
206 Maccoby and Mncokin found that legal conflict (and hence ongoing tension) was most
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This is a particular problem for never-married parents. The increased conflict
associated with collecting child support from never-married fathers tends to increase
parental stress enough to outweigh the benefits of the financial support.2 07 Thus, it
appears that judicially enforceable contact is beneficial only if it does not have to
be judicially enforced. To the extent that state interference with vertical
relationships increases the conflict and stress with which the custodial parent must
deal, clear evidence suggests that state interference can do children more harm than
good. If the justification for interfering with vertical relationships in single parent
households is rooted in protecting children, it is time to rethink that justification.
2. The Non-Custodial Parent's Interest in State Interference
Other justifications for state interference with vertical relationships include state
protection of the non-caretaldng parent's interest In the standard situation, the state
restricts the mother's autonomy in the interest of protecting the father's parental
rights. In order to evaluate this justification, one must remember that parenthood,
particularly fatherhood, is a legal construct.2 08 Neither common law nor the Due
Process Clause from which negative parental rights emanate20 9 supports the notion
that blood connection bestows positive paternal rights.210 The common law
conclusively presumed that the husband of the mother was the father of the child,211
and evidentiary rules prevented either the husband or the wife from testifying to
positively correlated to paternal claims for more custody or visitation. Fathers were most likely to
make such claims when they: (1) were concerned about the mother's caretaling ability, or (2)
expressed hostility toward the mother. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 131, at 272-74.
Courts often used joint custody as a means of resolving these disputes even though in most
situations the child continued to reside with the mother. See id. Thus, the father was given legal
rights as a way of pacifying him even though he did not bother to assume the responsibility that
the court afforded him the privilege of assuming.
207 See Sara McLanahan et al., Child-Support Enforcement and Child Well-Being: Greater
Security or Greater Conflict, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 239, 254 (Irwin
Garfinkel et al. eds., 1994).
208 See supra text accompanying notes 72-81; infra text accompanying notes 209-14.
209 For parental rights cases decided under the substantive due process doctrine, see Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). For parental
rights cases decided under the procedural due process doctrine, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
210 Deborah Forman suggests that the idea of biological connection as the basis for
parenthood is deeply rooted in our culture. See Forman, supra note 76, at 988-90. However, it
does not appear to be deeply rooted in our common law or constitutional jurisprudence.
211 See Mary Louise Fellows, The Law ofLegitimacy: An Instrument of Procreative Power,
3 COLUM. J. GENDER& L. 495,498-99 (1993).
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non-access. 212 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this kind of
presumption in Michael H. v. Gerald D.2 13 Thus, a mere genetic tie to a child is
insufficient grounds to restrict the parental rights of another biological parent who
has taken primary responsibility for the child.2 14
The right to restrict another parent's autonomy might come, however, from the
combination of a biological tie and some form of social relationship, perhaps in the
form of financial support or actual contact with the child.215 The question one needs
to ask about this justification is: Why? Only one-quarter of children in single parent
households see their biological father as often as once a week.216 Ten years after
divorce, nearly two-thirds of children will have gone a full year without any contact
with their father.217 One-third of the children of divorce do not see their non-
custodial parent on any sort of regular basis after the first year of separation.218 Only
one-sixth of children see their fathers at least once a week.219 The great majority of
children in "non-traditional" families-that is, approximately forty percent of the
212 See id. Lord Mansfield justified the presumption as "founded in decency, morality, and
policy," Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257,1258 (KB. 1777), presumably because it served
to protect the child from the stigma and poverty of illegitimacy. See Fellows, supra note 211, at
500. As Fellows notes, however, if a child had African-American features, nineteenth-century
courts refused to apply the marital presumption. See id at 500-01. Racial purity was, apparently,
a more important state interest than protection of the mixed race child.
213 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1988) (deeming constitutional California's conclusive presumption
that the man married to the woman who gave birth to the child is the child's father).
214 As Dorothy Roberts demonstrates, an African-American's paternal lineation has never
been particularly important either to his or her legal status as a non-white person or to his or her
social status in the African-American community. It was the genetic tie to a slave mother that
determined an African-American's legal status, and the African-American community itself has
never placed a primacy on the genetic tie as a source of identity. See Roberts, supra note 135, at
210-15.
2 15 Ofcourse, at a purely doctrinal level, the Supreme Court rejected this idea in MichaelH.
where the biological father, who had both supported the child financially and lived with the child
and her mother in a "family-like relationship," was afforded no right to maintain his relationship
to the child when the state conferred paternal status on the legal husband of the mother. See
MichaelIH., 491 U.S. 110.
216 See Judith A. Seltzer, Relationships Between Fathers and Children Who Live Apart: The
Father's Role After Separation, 53 J. MARRIAGE& FAM. 79,85 (1991).
217 See Frank F. Furstenburg Jr., Good Dads-Bad Dads: Two Faces ofFatherhood, in THE
CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY AND PUBLIC POLICY 190,203 (Andrew J. Cherlin ed., 1988). More
recently, Maccoby and Mnookin found what may be more father involvement Three-and-one-half
years after the divorce, only 14% of the fathers in their study had gone one year without seeing
their children. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 131, at 274.
218 See Frank F. Furstenburg, Jr. & Christine Winquist Nord, ParentingApart: Patterns of
ChildrearingAfter Marital Disruption, 475 J. MARRIAGE& FAM. 893 (1985).
219 See Furstenberg, supra note 217, at 203.
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children in this country220 -fail to have anything like the vertical relationships that
were described in Part IIB with their non-custodial parent. It is the interest of these
absentee parents that we protect when we interfere with the parental rights of
caretaking mothers.221
Recall the reasons for legal protection of vertical relationships. From the adults'
perspectives, there were several: children provide a bond of love; child rearing
enables a form of self-expression; and caring for children fosters a level of self-
sacrifice that helps develop a nobler sense of self. All of these benefits are
necessarily diminished with limited contact. For instance, an absentee parent may
take solace in knowing that his child loves him, but the quality of love is
proportional to the amount of time he has to give and receive it. As the primary
caretaker father who took day-to-day responsibility for his children stated: 'I know
my kids now. You can't love anyone you don't know .... And they love
me ... "222 The less a noncaretaker is with his child, the less significant the love
that either he or the child receives.
An absentee father is unlikely to use his relationship with his child as an outlet
for self-expression or as a vehicle for fostering selflessness. As the Supreme Court
noted in Smith, it is the "intimacy of daily association" that .'promot[es] a way of
life' through the instruction of children."223 Parents transmit values not so much by
what they say, but by what they do, how they live, and how they interact with
others. It is very difficult for this sort of education to be provided in weekly
sessions.224 Accepting financial responsibility for one's children may connote some
freedom to accept obligation as a form of self-expression,2 25 but such limited
engagement hardly seems like a way in which we can meaningfully "fulfill and
220 See Behrman & Quinn, supra note 122, at 4.
221 Of course, preservation of positive paternal rights also protects the interests of those non-
custodial fathers who actively participate in their children's lives. As will be explained later, letting
these men restrict the autonomy needs of custodial mothers may be perfectly appropriate, but only
if those fathers show that they have a substantial emotional connection to their children.
222 SWIGART, supra note 104, at 118-19.
223 Smith v. Organization ofFoster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,844 (1977)
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,231-33 (1972)).
224 To the extent non-custodial parents can provide this sort of education in weekly sessions,
one has to ask whether the "right" that the non-custodial parent may have to inculcate values
should obstruct the custodial spouse's "righf' to prohibit him from doing so. Moreover, as
explained earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 107-11, the child also has an interest in a
uniform value structure allowing her to develop her own sense of right and wrong. A child's
interest in uniformity may outweigh the non-custodial parent's right to inculcate values.
225 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. Of course, if child support is a state-




express [our] deepest values about how life is to be lived."226 Absentee parenthood
also requires less selflessness. Children may be "greed machines," 227 but one only
has to give when one is there: If a parent is not there, he has no opportunity "to get
into self-sacrifice."228 Thus, the benefits of vertical relationships are seriously
curtailed for the absentee parent and it is unclear why the law should be so willing
to restrict the caretaker's autonomy in order to protect his potential interest in the
connection to his child.229 Yet as we will see in both the unwed parent adoption
context and in the custody modification context, the law is often perfectly willing
to protect ephemeral paternal connection at the expense of maternal autonomy.
a. Unwed Parent Adoptions
In Augusta County Department of Social Services v. Unnamed Mother, the
biological and gestational mother, a divorced mother of four who knew who the
father of her child was and knew him to be a married friend of the family with
children of his own, claimed a right not to disclose the name of the father in the
adoption proceedings.2 30 As she told the court: 'I am the only one who really knows
the whole story. And I am doing what I think is best for my children, myself and the
baby."231 The court rejected her claims and ruled that she had to notify the
226 Richards, supra note 101, at 28.
227 SWIGART, supra note 104, at 118.
228 Id. at 119.
229 Some might argue that a father's financial responsibility for his offspring brings with it
certain paternal rights or privileges. Many courts and several statutes, wary of allowing visitation
rights to be "bought" and "sold," resist this argument by being careful not to tie parents' visitation
rights to child support. See IRA MARKELLMAN ErAL., FAMILYLAW, CASES, TEXr, PROBLEMS 364
(2d ed. 1991). Other courts are more comfortable with the potential commodification dangers
associated with treating visitation relationships as monetized goods. See id at 365. Evidence
suggests that at divorce many parents already commodify their relationships with their children
by trading custodial rights and obligations for income. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow ofthe Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950, 969
(1979). That being said, given how few women actually want to, see Chambers, supra note 127,
and do receive child support4 see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SER. P-23,
No. 167, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1987, at 4 (1990) (stating that approximately 50% of
women awarded child support payments receive full payment), it may be time to rethink the basis
of parental financial obligation. Although a full critique of paternity doctrine and child support is
beyond the scope of this Article, I would argue that just as demonstrated commitment to a child,
rather than blood, should give rise to parental rights, demonstrated acceptance ofresponsibility to
a child, rather than genetic connection, should give rise to parental financial responsibility. See
infra text accompanying notes 318-27.





biological father through publication.232 Note that if this woman was terminating
the pregnancy instead of carrying it to term, she would not have to notify the father
at all.2 33 Note, also, that if this woman were married instead of divorced, her
husband would be presumed to be the father of the child and the biological father
would have no constitutional right to know or prove otherwise.2 34 Note, finally, that
if this woman were married and making any other decision with regard to what was
best for any of her children, the court would presume that she was acting in her
child's best interest 235 and would not interfere even if the parents disagreed between
themselves. 236 Failing to note any of this inconsistent doctrine, the court in Augusta
County discounted the mother's autonomy interests in protecting her own and her
children's well-being so that it could preserve the potential relationship interest of
a man who did not even know he was the father of a child with whom he may not
have wanted to pursue a relationship.
Other unwed parent adoption cases demonstrate how the law is willing to grant
vertical relationship rights to a father based on his willingness to establish a
relationship with the mother, regardless of whether she wants to maintain a
relationship with him. In other words, the law protects his desire to form
relationships and ignores her desire to be free of them. In In re the Adoption ofBaby
Girl S., a New York court granted parental rights to a biological father who had
offered to marry and financially support the mother of the child put up for
adoption.2 37 The mother did not want to marry the biological father and did not
want him involved with her pregnancy because she was worried it would create
problems in her divorce and possibly lead her to lose custody of her nine-year-old
son.238 The court assumed that the man's offers of support were sufficiently
comparable to the woman's gestational contribution to endow him with positive
paternal rights and ignored her desire not to tell him.2 39 The court completely
232 See id. at 29.
233 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-88 (1992) (recognizing women's
need for autonomy).
234 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1988).
235 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
236 See Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So.2d 885 (Ala. 1959) (refusing to interfere in child rearing
decisions of an intact family).
237 See In re the Adoption of Baby Girl S., 535 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (1988).
238 See id.
239 The court took care to mention that he "told [the mother] that he loved her" as if that
statement in and of itself was important enough to confer parental rights. See id. Justice Stevens
demonstrated a similar attitude in Lehr v. Robertson when he noted that Mr. Lehr, who was
claiming the right to veto a stepparent adoption, never offered to marry the mother. See Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 252 (1983). Justice Stevens apparently did not contemplate the
possibility that the mother may not have wanted to marry him.
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disregarded the very real possibility that the desire to be free of the horizontal
relationship is what led the woman to put the child up for adoption. Giving parental
rights to this father-who had no physical or emotional connection to the child-
made the biological mother vulnerable both to vertical intimacy with the child (that
she may have wanted to avoid) and horizontal connection to and manipulation by
the biological father. For a woman yearning to be free of these connections, ignoring
her interests in putting the child up for adoption once again renders her need for
autonomy invisible.240
Some commentators have argued that we should protect paternal privileges
because, if the father has demonstrated a commitment to the mother, rewarding him
with privileges honors the importance of that commitment241 and encourages men
to be more engaged in the process of child rearing.242 "Children," Barbara
Woodhouse argues, "need parents who take responsibility for each other's well-
being as well as for their children.' 2 43 '"e notion of isolated parent-child dyads is
largely a legal construct All families... might benefit from a reshaping of cultural
and legal expectations in a more family-centric and less individualistic mold, to
measure parenthood by a yardstick of commitment and cooperation among adults
as well as towards children." 244 To Woodhouse, the law's focus on individual
parental rights ignores the inevitably interdependent nature of families.245
Woodhouse is correct in suggesting that children benefit from parents who take
responsiility for each other.246 As established, functioning families are emotionally
beneficial to their members in large part due to the enriching benefits of
240 Contrast this result with Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), in which the
Tennessee Supreme Court granted a sperm donor the right to destroy a fertilized ovum over the
objection of the egg donor who wanted to donate the fertilized egg to another couple. The court
held it would be repugnant to order the sperm donor to bear the psychological consequences of
paternity against his will. See id. at 603. The Court in Augusta County did not even consider what
negative psychological consequences might follow involuntary maternity. See Augusta County
Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Unnamed Mother, 348 S.E.2d 26 (Va. Ct. App. 1986). This is particularly
troubling given the evidence that pregnancy and the social construction of motherhood are likely
to make a biological mother's negative psychological consequences considerably more grave than
a biological father's. See Becker, supra note 175, at 142-53 (stating that women experience
motherhood more intensely than fathers experience fatherhood).
241 See Woodhouse, supra note 9. Woodhouse emphatically rejects the discourse of"rights"
in this context because a notion of 'rights" "rejects children's needs for adult responsibility and
increases adversariness among adults." Ia at 1811.
242 See Forman, supra note 76, at 988-1000.
243 Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 1812.
244 Id at 1784 (citations omitted).
245 See id at 1810.
246 Interdependent family relationships tend to produce the happiest, most stable children.
See FURSrENBERG & CIERLIN, supra note 187, at 68-70.
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interdependence. Indeed, it is interdependence that serves as the basis for affording
intact families protection from governmental interference. 247 The problem with
Woodhouse's interdependent approach, however, is that parents only try to assert
positive parental rights against each other when the interdependence has dissolved.
As Deborah Forman has noted "at the time... [of the assertion of positive parental
rights] no interdependentfamily really exists. The court's emphasis on individual
rights does not cause the breakdown of these families or prevent them from
forming; real interpersonal conflicts do."'248 Moreover, in many cases, the
interdependence never existed. Many of the children born in this country are the
result of dating relationships that, one can assume, had not reached a substantial
level of interdependence. 249
Deborah Forman's alternative proposal for paternal rights roots the protection
of unwed father's rights in biology in order to encourage men to think of themselves
as caretaking fathers, not just as financial obligors or sperm donors2 50 Forman
argues that by protecting a noncaretaking father's right to develop relationships with
his children, the law sends a symbolic and substantive message with regard to
paternal caretaking. 251 Protecting the right encourages men to develop relationships.
As Forman herself notes, however, the bestowal of paternal rights seriously
compromises the mother's privacy and autonomy.252 To justify this, Forman
suggests that the courts should make sure that fathers have demonstrated a sufficient
commitment to their children before awarding these rights.253
The problem is that providing an opportunity to demonstrate that paternal
commitment also necessarily interferes with the caretaker's autonomy. This is not
an inconsequential concern. Mothers commonly exercise their common law right
to bestow paternal rights on their husbands and thereby keep their nuclear families
intact. One study by physicians doing organ research suggested that five to twenty
247 See supra Part II.A.
248 Forman, supra note 76, at 1012 (emphasis added).
249 See David L. Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80
MICH. L. REv. 1614, 1619 (1982). In these situations, Woodhouse would confer paternal
privileges not on the biological father, but on the person who supported the mother during
pregnancy and after. See Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 1844-51. However, it is not clear what the
law should do in the absence of such a supportive (presumably male?) person. Need the law assign
parental privilege to anyone else? How can itjustify assigning those privileges to a male support
person but not to the mother's other friends and family? If a biological mother's sister is more
supportive than her new boyfriend, should the sister get greater privileges? What about the
mother's female lover? Should we assume that a sexual bond with a primary caretaker gives one
more privilege with regard to a child that is not the result of that sexual bond? Why?
25 0 See Forman, supra note 76, at 988-1000.
251 See id. at 991.




percent of the children in their sample were not biologically related to their legal
fathers.254 A woman also may want to keep her pregnancy a secret for a number of
reasons,2 55 not the least of which is to protect herself from domestic violence.256
When courts protect a man's right to develop a relationship with his biological
offspring, the mother, who may well have no more than a dating relationship with
the father, 57 is often left geographically and relationally bound to the father so that
he can maintain a relationship that will, in all likelihood, consist of no more than
weekly visits.
b. Custody Modification
Custody relocation cases also provide clear examples of courts' willingness to
protect men's often ephemeral relational interest, while ignoring or dismissing
women's need for autonomy. In determining whether a custodial parent should be
able to move, most courts again rely on the ambiguous and discretionary best
interest of the child standard.2 58 With that discretion comes a clear tendency to
ignore women's needs. Courts tend to discount women's autonomy both when they
focus solely on the children's best interests and when they ostensibly recognize that
parental interests can be relevant to children's best interests. First, the courts that
concentrate on the child's interest focus on the child's interest in maintaining a
relationship with the non-custodial parent.259 This makes sense. Children always
254 See BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD 225 (1989). Other studies
estimate the percentage is as low as five percent See id
255 See In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1l. 1995) (regarding a mother who misled the
father into believing that the baby was dead after the father abandoned her); Robert O. v. Russell
K., 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992) (regarding a father who did not know about his biological child's
adoption until the child was 10 months old); Augusta County Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Unnamed
Mother, 348 S.E.2d 26 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring notice to father by publication).
256 This was the reasoning on which the Supreme Court relied in striking down the spousal
notification provision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 883, 887-95 (1992). Forcing
women to tell their sexual partner that they were pregnant was found too dangerous to a woman's
health. See id.
25 7 See Chambers, supra note 249, at 1619.
258 Different states use different formal standards to adjudicate these issues, but most states
rely on the best interest test and differ only on who has the burden ofproofin establishing whether
a move will be in the child's best interest See Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathi'ng ,ith Solomon:
ChoosingBetween Parents in a Mobile Society, 31 U. LOuisvIL J. FAM. L. 791,804-31 (1992).
The two notable exceptions, at opposite ends of the spectrum, are New York, which requires the
parent who wants to move to show exceptional circumstances necessitating the move, see id. at
804-10, and Minnesota, which requires the non-custodial parent to show that the move will cause
actual detriment to the child, see id at 828-3 1.
2 59 See Costa v. Costa, 429 So.2d 1249 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1983); Sambola v. Sambola, 493
So.2d 206 (La. Ct. App. 1986); In re Marriage of Meier, 595 P.2d 474 (Or. 1979).
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have an abstract interest in maintaining relationships with their parents,260 and,
compared to what are only the potential benefits of a new home for the child, the
benefits of maintaining the non-custodial parent relationship are less speculative.
The non-custodial parent, usually the man, is the beneficiary of the courts' desire
for surety and consistency.
The same problem occurs when courts acknowledge that they should take into
consideration the interests of both parents. The child's interest in maintaining
contact with the non-custodial parent and the non-custodial parent's interest in a
relationship with his child fold into one interest that benefits two of the three
relevant parties. The custodial parent's interest is thus easily outweighed by the
interests of the other two. As a New Jersey court recognized, however, in most
cases, "the best interests of a child are so interwoven with the well-being of the
custodial parent, the determination of the child's best interests requires that the
interests of the custodial parent be taken into account."2 61 In reality, therefore,
because: (1) the child always has an interest in maintaining a relationship with the
non-custodial parent, and (2) the child and the custodial parent's interest so readily
overlap, the child's interest drops out. If the non-custodial parent has worked to
establish a relationship, the loss of which will hurt the child, the non-custodial
parent's interest in maintaining the relationship will be as one with the child's
interest. On the other hand, a child's interest in moving will be dependent on the
importance of the move to the well-being of the custodial parent. Ifrestricting the
custodial parent's autonomy and preventing her from exercising her own capacity
for emotional and financial growth adversely effects her well-being, the child will
suffer. Thus, courts could develop a much more honest26 2 and consistent test263 if
they just weighed the interests of both parents against each other, with the weight
2 60 Experts will always be available to testify that in an ideal world a child would be able to
maintain contact with both parents. See Costa, 429 So.2d at 1252. The problem is that in situations
in which divorced parents are already in court fighting about this issue, the situation is, by
definition, far from ideal.
261 Cooper v. Cooper, 491 A.2d 606, 612 (N.J. 1984); see also JurrrH S. WAUERSEIN &
JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 114,224-25 (1980) (presenting research regarding
the parent-child relationship and coping mechanisms after divorce).
262 As noted above, the ,esf-interest test has been widely criticized for its inevitable
incorporation ofjudicial bias and paternalism. See Chambers, supra note 194, at 491.
263 Different states and often different courts within states have come to widely varying
results in these cases. Compare In re Marriage of Nodot, 401 N.E.2d 1189 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)
(refusing removal), with Arquilla v. Arquilla, 407 N.E.2d 948 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (permitting
removal). See also Leslie v. Leslie, 579 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) ("It is well
established that in the absence of exceptional circumstances a custodial parent may not, by
relocating to a distant locale, deprive the noncustodial parent of reasonable visitation:); Lozinak
v. Lozinak 569 A.2d 353 (Pa. Super. CL 1990) (forcing the mother to choose between moving to
be with new husband and continued custody).
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to be afforded the non-custodial parent's interest in a vertical relationship dependent
on the strength of the pre-existing relationship.
To the extent that such a test seems to minimize the interests of the children,
remember that courts are powerless to actually prevent parents from moving. All a
court can do is modify a custody decree. A child may have an interest in the
custodial and non-custodial parent staying close to each other, but the non-custodial
parent can move away without any incident and the custodial spouse can move as
long as she is willing to sacrifice custody.264 The child's interests are not served by
either move, but the child's interests do not govern because we do not force parents
to stay with their children. We do not even force parents to visit their children.265
By balancing the interests of the parents against each other, courts can incorporate
the children's interests to the extent they always have and in the same way parents
do. In the great majority of circumstances, children's interests are served by serving
the interests of the parents.266 That is the nature of intimacy.
Shifting the focus from the child to the parents' interests should help the court
acknowledge the importance of custodial spouse autonomy. For many divorced
women, the ability to act and feel autonomous is critical to their emotional and
financial happiness. Women's standard of living drops dramatically after divorce2 67
and stays low for as long as they remain unmarried.2 68 Remarriage is the single best
way for divorced women to improve the economic well-being of both themselves
and their children.2 69 To the extent that protecting the positive parental rights of the
non-custodial parent decreases the custodial parent's freedom to remarry, the law
264 Janet Bowermaster made this point first. See Bowermaster, supra note 258, at 839-42.
265 Some have argued that courts should have precisely that authority. See Karen
Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV.
1415, 1437-40 (1991).
266 Naomi Calm has also recognized that children and parents' interests often overlap. See
Cahn, supra note 132, at 49. Depending on the age of the child, it might also be appropriate for
the court to ask the child about his or her own interests. To the extent that children can articulate
their own interests and courts are capable of ascertaining whether those articulated interests have
been unduly influenced by one of the parents, children deserve to be heard. See Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981) ("Where a child is old enough to formulate an opinion about
his or her own custody the trial court is entitled to receive such opinion and accord it such weight
as he feels appropriate."). For the problems with allowing the child's opinion to control, see Rose
v. Rose, 340 S.E.2d 176 (W. Va. 1985), in which the court upheld an order switching custody to
the father based on the child's testimony that he did not like his mother's boyfriend. The child said
he did not like the boyfriend after his father had told him that the boyfriend was the reason his
parents got divorced. See id. at 177.
2 67 See note 184 and accompanying text.
2 68 See Greg J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic




sacrifices both the custodial parent's and the children's economic well-being.
Moreover, for those custodial mothers who do not remrany, their own labor income
is the primary source of family income.270 Restricting women's ability to earn more
money not only hurts them, it hurts the children for whom they care.271
Respecting women's autonomy needs also means rejecting the practices of
placing the burden of proof on the custodial parent who wants to change the status
quo272 and including geographical restrictions in divorce decrees.273 Such practices
confirm the view that women care primarily about interdependence, not growth as
independent beings. As suggested, however, divorced women often have a critical
need to grow on their own. They have increased financial needs (hence they may
want to move for a new job),274 increased caretaking needs (hence they may want
to move to be closer to family),275 and increased desires for horizontal relationships
(hence they may want to move to be with a new partner).2 76 Chances are also good
270 See id. Maccoby and Mnookin's findings deserve special mention: "[F]or
most... families... divorce impose[s] a significant reallocation of gender roles .... [IT]he father
had assumed primary responsibility for the financial support.... After the divorce, this is no
longer the case .... [C]ustodial mothers become the primary source of support for their
children ... even in those households where child support is paid in full" MACCOBY& MNOOKIN,
supra note 131, at 271.
271 In those rare situations in which men do have custody of the children and wish to move,
courts rarely restrict the father's autonomy. In six of the eight father-removal cases studied by
Professor Bowermaster, courts allowed the father's requested relocation, and, in the remaining two
cases, the court remanded with rules favorable to the father. See Bowermaster, supra note 258, at
847.
272 See Bowermaster, supra note 258, at 810-21. For cases where the custodial parent bore
the burden of proof, see Tantilla v. Tantilla, 382 P.2d 798 (Co. 1963); Leslie v. Leslie, 579
N.Y.S.2d 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
273 See Bell v. Bell, 572 So.2d 841, 844 (Miss. 1990) (recognizing that geographical
restrictions in divorce decrees were becoming more common); In re Marriage of Sheley, 895 P.2d
850 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (prohibiting the custodial parent from moving out of eastern
Washington state).
274 See Fingert v. Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (permitting custodial
mother to move from California to Chicago, to take over her father's business because he was
retiring); In re Marriage ofSheley, 895 P.2d 850 (having previously stayed home with children,
custodial parent wanted to move from Seattle to Texas to ajob that was offering $50,000 per year).
275 See Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 418 S.E.2d 675 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (moving to
California to be near family so that they could help with caretaking); In re Marriage ofSheley, 895
P.2d 850 (moving to Texas would have put custodial parent closer to her family who could help
with caretaking).
2 76 See In re Marriage of Davis, 594 N.E.2d 734 (11. App. Ct. 1992) (new spouse had new
job outside of Illinois); In re Berk, 574 N.E.2d 1364 (11. App. Ct. 1991) (The mother's new
husband had requested a transfer before he met her. When the transfer came through, he had to
move or lose his job.).
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that these women have already made at least one move in order to accommodate the
desires of their now ex-husbands. Women are more likely than men to move away
from their families when they get married.2 77 Wives are also much more likely to
follow their husbands' jobs than are husbands to follow their wives' jobs.2 78 When,
after divorce, it is the wife's turn to move, courts routinely make her choose
between her children and herself, a choice she never forced her husband to make.
By refusing to recognize the needs that divorced women have for autonomy after
divorce, courts penalize them for having invested in interdependence in the first
place. Courts tie these women to places they do not want to be and to relationships
they wish to be free of, all in the name ofprotecting a paternal vertical relationship
that often exists more as a matter of legality than reality.
Finally, the law's discounting of women's autonomy interests can be seen in
child custody modification decisions that do not involve physical relocation. In
Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, the court took custody away from the mother
because of what it saw as "the lesser concern of the mother for the emotional well-
being of her children than for her own life style."279 The court failed to give any
weight to the mother's need for her own lifestyle or to the inevitable overlapping
interests of the custodial parent and the children. Other courts have been willing to
take custody away from women who were making other autonomy-enhancing
decisions because the court presumed that raising children and such autonomy-
enhancing behavior were mutually exclusive. The trial court in Ireland v. Smith
awarded custody to the biological father of the child because the mother had
received a scholarship and decided to pursue studies at the University of
Michigan.280 The trial court found "no way that a single parent, attending an
academic program at an institution as prestigious as the University of Michigan,
[could] do justice to their studies and to [the] raising of an infant child."2' 1 Although
this case was overturned on appeal,282 the trial court's decision is particularly
disturbing. Not only did the court completely discount the importance of the
custodial parent taking care of her own needs, it awarded custody to a biological
father who did not seek visitation for the first year of the child's life, had never
provided any financial support for the child, had never assumed sole obligation for
taking care of the child, and who was planning on having his mother care for the
child.2 83 He had the most minimal of established relationship interests with which
277 See Bowermaster, supra note 258, at 345 n.271.
278 See id.
27 9 Friederitzer v. Friederwitzer, 432 N.E.2d 765,769 (N.Y. 1982).
280 See Ireland v. Smith, 542 N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
281 Id. at 349.
282 See id. at 344.
283 See icL at 348-49.
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to combat her need for autonomy, but the court still protected his right to develop
a better relationship.
C. Summary
Thus, in the horizontal and vertical relationship contexts, we see the inverse
gendered effects of state interference. Horizontally, women need less state
deference. Vertically, women need more state deference. Women receive relatively
little benefit from the state's refusal to interfere in horizontal relationships because
the interdependence fostered by state deference does little to serve women's needs
although it helps men feel a sense of connection. Women's autonomy interests
would benefit from comparable state deference to vertical relationships, but the state
continually interferes with mothers' negative parental rights, and it does so in the
name of protecting men's desire for connection to others. Deborah Forman argues
that the law should interfere to protect men's desire for relationships with their
children because it "serves feminist goals by infusing notions of commitment and
responsibility into the concept of rights ... by encouraging men to take an active
and meaningful role in parenting their children. '284 Protecting positive paternal
rights only serves some feminist goals, however. It severely hinders those feminist
goals aimed at encouraging women to free themselves from seemingly obligatory
interdependence and connection, particularly to men with whom they no longer
wish to associate at an intimate level. Protecting positive paternal rights also
undermines cultural feminist goals because it undervalues the caretaking that
women do by failing to recognize how much more women invest in their children.
If the law really valued women's caretaking work, it would afford them negative
legal protection based on their caretaking responsibilities.285 As noted above,
women do vastly more caretaking than men2 86 but the law barely rewards them for
284 Forman, supra note 76, at 1043.
285 To the extent that the law makes custody decisions based on who has invested more in
caring for the child, see generally infra text accompanying notes 318-19, the law does respect the
caretaking that women do, but the law does not sufficiently respect the caretaking work that
women do to allow it to serve as a reason for deferring to an unmarried woman's parenting
decisions. The law does not allow her to be as good a parent as she was before a divorce because,
at divorce, the primary caretaker loses the freedom to parent.
286 Maecby and Mnookin note that:
In a substantial majority of our [subjects] we believe the mother had primary managerial
responsibility for the child-rearing functions before the divorce. Although fathers were often
involved in the day-to-day lives of their children, we judge (on the basis of other studies as
well as our own) that on average they usually spent much less time alone with the children




that. Instead, it protects biological fathers by granting them positive parental rights
that preserve what are often abstract desires for connection and ignores the
autonomy interests that would be served by taking women's negative parental rights
seriously.
IV. PROPERTY IN RELATIONSHIP: A FEMINIST SOLUTION
The analysis in Part II suggested that both horizontal and vertical relationships
need freedom and space in the form of legal protection and deference if they are to
flourish. The state usually provides this space in the horizontal context, but in the
vertical context it does so only if the parents are married. As we saw in Part III,
from the standpoint of women's needs, this inconsistent treatment of relationships
is precisely backwards, but it does suggest a consistent pattern: The law tends to
protect men's (often) latent desires for interconnection and intimacy at the expense
of women's (often) latent desires for autonomy and independence. This Part will
argue that it is possible for courts to redress the disturbing willingness to discount
women's autonomy interests by recasting a custodial parent's interest in her
relationship with her child, not as a liberty interest "more precious than any property
right"287 but as an interest as precious as any property right As Mary Anm Glendon
has commented, "[i]n America, when we want to protect something, we try to get
it characterized as a right .... [W]hen we specially want to hold on to
something,] ... we try to get the object of our concern characterized as a property
right."288 By analyzing parental claims as liberty interests, not property rights,
courts have subjected those interests to the interpretive discretion implicit in the
term "liberty"289 and lost many of the benefits that property rhetoric affords.
Among those benefits are: acknowledgement of hierarchical relationships,
protection of investment, and respect for boundaried autonomy. All of these
concepts, if applied properly, would allow courts to honor women's independence
without sacrificing men's commitment to relationship.
The property models offered here are just that, models. I offer them as much for
their heuristic potential as for their concrete application. My aim is to reorient our
MACCOBY & MNOOIN, supra note 131, at 268; see also supra notes 162, 173; FINEMAN, supra
note 29, at 162 (stating that women do more caretaking than men regardless of whether the woman
and man are sharing a household); Becker, supra note 175, at 153-58 (same); John P. Robinson,
Caringfor Kids, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, July 1989, at 52.
2 87 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,758 (1982).
288 GLENDON, supra note 9, at 31.
289 Property is not the most concrete of terms either, but as explained previously, a number
of the concepts associated with property interests can be particularly beneficial to custodial parents
with a vested interest in their relationship with their children.
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thinking in this area in order to free us from the law's current tendency to assume:
(1) that all parents are equally invested in and deserving of vertical relationships,
and (2) that the privacy boundary thought critical to the traditional nuclear family's
health must evaporate if the nuclear family does not exist.
A. A Defensive Defense ofProperty
Before more fully explicating the benefits of property, it is worth giving an
initial defense of the beleaguered property framework, particularly given the
overwhelming sentiment against using property rhetoric in the family context.290
First, anti-property arguments notwithstanding, many people think of themselves
as owning their children. As Stephen Gilles writes, "[a]s against the rest of the
world, the child is its parents' 'own."' 2 91 Usually this possessive sense brings with
it an ability, if not a privilege,292 to influence strongly the thought, action, and
behavior of those who are "ours."293 This influence may be critical to a child's well-
being. "It is only when individual parents relate to individual children that parents
can think of their children as their own; most people are incapable of devoting
themselves to children unless they can think of them in this way."294 As Bruce
Hafen notes, children often crave the sense of connection and belonging implicit in
concepts of possession.2 95
Second, in adopting property paradigms, I am not suggesting that the property
right actually attach to the child him or herself, but instead to the relationship. A
parent should have an earned property interest in her relationship with her child.
People worry about too much commodification of personal attributes because of the
tendency of market rhetoric to extract the attribute or thing from the person 296
Thus, contracts for surrogate mothers and prostitution are worrisome because the
market tends to treat the person who is providing the service as nothing more than
290 See Cahn, supra note 132, at 49; Nedelsky, supra note 5, at 16; Regan, Spouses and
Strangers, supra note 37, at 2350; Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 1811-14.
291 Gilles, supra note 97, at 961.
292 For the argument that a parent's ability to influence his or her child should be construed
as a privilege, not a right, see James Dwyer, Parent's Religion and Children's Welfare, 82 CAL.
L. REV. 1371, 1447 (1994).
293 The ability to influence "our" family members is not limited to vertical familial
relationships. Spouses and siblings routinely exercise this kind of control over each other.
2 9 4 JEFFREY BLUSTEIN, PARENTS AND CHILDREN 37 (1982).
295 See Hafen, supra note 53, at 31. Hafen tells the story of a girl who, after being told at
school that she did not belong to anyone else, looked at her mother and asked, "'I am yours aren't
I, Mom?"' Id.
296 See Radin, supra note 2, at 1907.
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the service itself instead of respecting the person's "personhood."297 A prostitute or
surrogate mother ceases to be a person and is seen only for the service that she
provides. She is seen as a thing.
Treating vertical relationships as property interests is not likely to lead to a
comparable tendency to treat children as things, however, because the relationship
itself cannot be sold. Although the potential to develop and cultivate a relationship
might be bargained over between the adults with an interest in such a relationship,
the demand for the product is severely limited. Unlike markets for newborns,
surrogate mothers, or prostitutes, demand for a legally enforceable claim for a
relationship to a non-newborn child is very low. People want their "own" child; they
do not want to share or even buy someone else's non-newborn. The lack of demand
greatly diminishes the dangers of market rhetoric.2 98
Moreover, significant bargaining for relative parental rights already occurs in
the divorce context. As Mnookin and Kornhauser concluded twenty years ago,
"over some range of alternatives, each parent may be willing to exchange custodial
rights and obligations for income or wealth, and parents may tie support duties to
custodial prerogatives .... 299 To the extent that such bargaining already exists,
parents already commodify their relationships with their children. There is no reason
to assume that the law's explicit recognition of an adult's property interest will
exacerbate the harms of commodification, particularly if the law makes clear that
property rights in vertical relationships, like some other property rights, are
inalienable.300 Thus, in this instance we can adopt property rhetoric without
increasing the harms that come with commodification.
Third, it is important to recognize, as Carol Rose has, that:
Property and its rhetoric are far more subtle, nuanced, and accommodating than
[many] caricature[s] would suggest As it is actually used, property rhetoric reflects
the central role of the institution of property in mediating human conflicts.... It
also reflects a mode of thinking that has great power in revealing the underlying
structures of human relationships .... 301
To abandon the advantages of property rhetoric simply because it has served us ill
297 See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982) (discussing the relationship between property rights and personhood).
298 For a defense of the use of market rhetoric and commodification discourse in order to
more fully value women's labor, see Silbaugh, supra note 2. In her article, Silbaugh uses
economics discourse much as I use property discourse here-as a vehicle to more fully reward
women for the work that they actually perform. See id at 95, 99-104, 112-20.
2 99 Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 229, at 969 (1979).
30 0 See Calabresi & Malamed, supra note 1, at 1111-15. Contracts for inalienable goods are
unenforceable. See id
301 Rose, supra note 4, at 2410.
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in the past sends us into a discretionary world of ruleless adjudication that may
deprive women of an opportunity to make their case in a language that the law can
best understand. Just as rights rhetoric can help empower and connect groups that
have traditionally been disenfranchised,302 so can property rhetoric help give
substantive content to the work that a woman does and the values that the family is
supposed to embody.
Finally, to the extent that notions of hierarchy, investment, and boundary offend
the collective, faith-based understanding of family with which people are more
comfortable, one must keep in mind that property principles are offered here to help
adjudicate disputes only if the family, as ideally defined, has ceased to, or never did,
exist. Property may not be the way we think about our family relationships when
our families are intact, but the question in this context is whether property is an
appropriate framework for courts to use if the family is dissolved.
B. The Advantages ofProperty Theory
1. Hierarchy
To be comfortable with property rhetoric, one must first be willing to accept
what Stephen Munzer calls "the sophisticated conception of property; '30 3 that is,
one must understand property not as things but as relations. "[P]roperty consists in
certain relations, usually legal relations, among persons or other entities with respect
to things."304 A property right is a right vis-A-vis another person with regard to a
thing. As indicated above, in the vertical relationship context, the "thing" at issue
is not the child itself, but the relationship with the child. Thus, the res itself is
inherently fluid, as are all relationships. The fluid, context-dependent nature of the
res does not make it any less like property, however. For instance, water, a
paradigrnatically fluid res, has always been the subject of property law.305 What
property law provides is a framework for looking at the relative ability of different
people to effect the res. The person with riparian property rights cannot completely
control the stream because the stream is not completely controllable, but the riparian
owner has more right to affect the stream than does her non-riparian neighbor.3 06
Comparably, a person with primary parental rights cannot completely control a
child, but she should have more influence over that child than a less invested parent
A system of property rights establishes a hierarchy of entitlements to the res. In
302 See Minow, supra note 9, at 1874.
303 STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 16 (1990).
304 Id. at 16.
305 See, e.g., A. DAN TALOCK, THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS & RESOURCES (1994).
306 For a general discussion ofriparian rights, see ROGER CUNNINGHAM ETAL, THELAW OF
PROPERTY424-26 (2d ed. 1993).
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doing so, the system relies on the concept of relativity of title. Any number of
people can have some colorable and enforceable claim to ares. The role of property
law is to determine who has the best claim at any given time. Thus, in another
example, the first finder of a wallet on the sidewalk has a better claim to the wallet
than the person who comes upon that wallet later, but the true owner of that wallet
has a better claim than does the first finder of the wallet, unless that owner is
deemed to have abandoned her interest in the wallet.307 Finder One, Finder Two,
and True Owner all have valid claims to the wallet, but the law deems some claims
stronger than others. The law rarely, if ever, requires that all three people share the
wallet.
Yet sharing is precisely what the law has required with regard to vertical
relationship rights. The law has assumed that once an adult has some relationship
with a child, or even the potential for a relationship with a child, the res can be
shared. As detailed above, however, court-enforced sharing is not necessarily good
for the child, and it is clearly detrimental to the person who would otherwise have
better title. Accepting relativity of title and the hierarchy it establishes in parental
relationships would move courts away from their current tendency to assume that
rights must be shared and towards an evaluation of the relative weight of the claims
in interest. If the claims do not have equal weight, it may be perfectly appropriate
to vest superior title in the person with the best claim.
Affording different weight to individual family members' claims may strike
many as inappropriate precisely because, as suggested earlier, the family's
alternative sense of justice relies on a collective, "to each according to his need,
from each according to his ability" ethic.30 8 Principles of forgiveness and faith
suggest that families are supposed to share regardless of ability, contribution, or
desert. We scorn distributional inequalities in such systems.3 09 Family systems are
broken (or never were working) if the law is involved in adjudicating vertical
relationship rights, however. Faith and forgiveness may help the family function as
a lasting interdependent unit, but, if that unit has been shattered, it may be necessary
to abandon more ideal, collective concepts ofjustice in favor of rules that award
benefits to those who most deserve them. What family law needs from property
rhetoric is the acceptance of the unequal distributions implicit in a hierarchical
system. In protecting men's potential for relationship at the expense of women's
autonomy, courts have allocated rights based on the collective principle of equality
even though the collectivity has dissolved.
30 7 
"[Tlhe title of the finder is good as against the whole world but the true owner ..... RAY
A. BROWN, Ti LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 25 (3d ed. 1975); see also JEsSE DuKEmNi &
JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 105 (3d ed. 1993).
30 8 See supra note 56.
30 9 See JENNIFER HOCH.SCHILD, WHAT'S FAIR? AMERICAN BELIEFS ABour DISTRm uv
JuSnTcE 32, 48-49, 107 (1981).
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2. Investment Theory
As Jennifer Hochschild has analyzed from the standpoint of what Americans
currently believe about distributive justice310 and as Jennifer Nedelsky has analyzed
from an American historical standpoint,31 some distributional inequalities are
acceptable and perhaps even desirable.312 We tend to see distributional inequalities
as permissible byproducts of private property when there is some acceptable theory
of desert that explains the disparity in distribution. Investment in relationship could
be one such legitimating theory. By scorning theories of desert in family law, courts
blind themselves to the overwhelmingly greater amount of work that women
perform in families.313 Accepting theories of desert would encourage the law to
recognize and reward the work that women do.
Property law thrives on evaluating relative claims of desert. As David Ellerman
has written, labor desert theory is the principal normative theory of property.3 14
Family law need not abandon this norm; it needs to reevaluate what counts as
labor.3 15 As suggested above, intimacy is work. Indeed, John Locke's maxim that
'tis labor that puts the difference of value on every thing"316 seems particularly
persuasive in the context of relationship. A relationship is worth more the more one
310 See id. (discussing overall American views on distribution of wealth and status).
3 11 See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTTUTIONALiSM 205-08,223-31 (1990).
312 This is the theory that Professor Regan uses against the use of property rhetoric in the
horizontal context when he argues that an acceptance of inequality leads to undercompensation
of women at divorce. See Regan, Spouses and Strangers, supra note 37, at 2356-61. 1 am turning
Regan's argument around in the vertical relationship context, arguing that an acceptance of
inequality would lead to acceptable compensation for women who have disproportionately
invested in their children.
313 This work includes the work of intimacy, see FINEMAN, supra note 29, at 162 (stating that
"intimacy and its maintenance have always been and continue to be disproportionately allocated
to women"), the work of caretaking, see Becker, supra note 175, at 154 ("Cearetaking is done by
women most of the time in most families"), and the more mundane work required to keep a home
functioning, see HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 162, at 3 (asserting that working women
perform up to one full month a year more work in the home than do men). See also Lewin, supra
note 162, at Al (stating that the average women spends 11 1/2 years taking care of others; the
average man spends 6 months).
3 14 See David Ellerman, On the Labor Theory of Property, 16 PHIL. F. 273, 273, 302-04
(1985).
3 15 For an insightful and comprehensive account of how the law has always discounted the
familial work that women do, see Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and
the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996).




puts into it. The more one cultivates interconnection and selflessness and intimacy,
the more meaningful the relationship will be for both parties. People who expend
that labor on behalf of themselves and their children should be rewarded with the
value of the relationship. If those who have not traditionally invested in a
relationship want to reap its rewards, they must work for it.317
Some feminists resist investment theory. Katharine Bartlett wants to construct
parenthood "based upon the cycle of gift rather than the cycle of exchange. '318
Investment theory relies on notions of entitlement that undermine the voluntary gift
quality of parenthood.319 Part of what makes parenting intrinsically valuable,
according to Bartlett, is its voluntary nature. But under her system, a court is still left
to evaluate who has given more of the gifts. The ultimate question is who has
invested more. Comparably, Barbara Woodhouse's "generism" approach allocates
authority based on the "stewardship" that has been "earned during gestation and
childhood and exercised in service to the child's emerging capacity."320 Naomi
Calm's multiple parenthood approach requires identifying those adults who have
invested emotionally in the child.321 The primary caretaker standard322 and the
many best interest tests administered during the initial child custody decision323 also
evaluate and reward the person who has invested the most in developing a
relationship with the child. Reticent as people are to adopt property rhetoric in the
family law context, relying on labor investment theory, the "principal normative
theory of property" seems inescapable.
Others may argue that even if one uses a kind of investment theory, financial
317 Property law often rewards she who invests over she who simply holds title. A normative
desire to reward investment explains everything from the assignment of property rights in news,
see International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241 (1918) (awarding property
rights in company that invested in finding the news, not in the company that possessed news), to
the doctrines ofunjust enrichment, see Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E2d 805, 813 (W. Va. 1969)
(holding that investing in another's land can be rewarded for the value of the investment), and
adverse possession, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 132 (1997)
(explaining that adverse possession allows the productive user to take from the unproductive user).
3 18 Bartlett, supra note 9, at 295.
3 19 See id. at 300-31.
32 0 Woodhouse, supra 9, at 1818-19 (emphasis added).
321 See Cahn, supra note 132, at 44-48 (emphasis added).
322 Foran evaluation ofthe primary caretaker standard, see Becker, supra note 175, at 190-
202. The primary caretaker standard awards custody based not on a best interest standard, but on
an evaluation of who has been the primary caretaker. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357,361
(W. Va. 1981).
323 See Jeff Atkinson, Criteria forDeciding Child Custody in the Trial andAppellate Couts,
18 FAM. L.Q. 1, 16-19 (1984) (explaining that many state court decisions now recognize the
importance ofthe "primaiy caretaker" even ifa primary caretaker standard has not been adopted
by the legislature); see also Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986).
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investment in a vertical relationship entitles one to some share of that vertical
relationship. In the traditional nuclear family, for instance, the father invests a
disproportionate amount of money in the child rearing process, while the mother
invests a disproportionate amount of time and emotional energy. These parents (and
many courts) may think of this labor allocation as a partnership in the enterprise of
child rearing, with both parties having invested in the partnership and both parties
being entitled to parental relationships at dissolution. However, there are significant
problems with the partnership analogy.
As a matter of business partnership law, at dissolution, partnerships are
liquidated or put up for auction.324 Business partners have no right to a distribution
in kind.325 In other words, the law forces the value of the partnership enterprise to
be reduced to money, and a court then divides the proceeds. For obvious reasons,
investments in children cannot be liquidated. For not so obvious reasons, the law
often still treats such investments as divisible. At divorce, the law forces parents to
share the investments that they had previously made distinct. Thus, separated
parents split the rights to relationship and the financial burdens of child rearing. Yet
it is not at all clear that dividing the "partnership" in this manner benefits the
child 326 or appropriately compensates the adults.
If the bulk of what one has given to a relationship is money, then money (or
some relief from a previously assumed financial obligation) should be adequate
compensation at dissolution. In such a case, money is an accurate reflection of the
investment one has made. On the-other hand, if what one has given to a relationship
is primarily emotional investment, it is highly unlikely that money will be an
adequate substitute.3 27 Moreover, the opportunity costs of one who has financially
invested in a vertical relationship are vastly different than the opportunity costs of
one whose investment has been non-pecuniary. Men who have been contributing
economically have been simultaneously maintaining if not enhancing their
opportunities to invest in other things (e.g., better jobs, other businesses, expensive
leisure goods or activities). Women who have been investing unpaid emotional
energy and time-that is, women who have done the work of intimacy--have done
this to the exclusion of other opportunities. Thus, women who have invested
significant emotional energy have enhanced the value of the vertical relationship,
but their investment is inherently indivisible and non-fungible because the
relationship has no value in an external market.
If the divorcing parties choose, as many do, to continue some form of division
of labor, with one parent continuing to contribute financially while the other parent
324 See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 807 (1994).
325 See id. § 402.
326 See supra Part III.B.1.
327 The greater one's emotional investment in a relationship, the more emotionally valuable
that relationship is and the less likely that it can be meaningfully reduced to money.
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invests the bulk of the emotional labor, then the parties may agree to give the paying
parent some right to a relationship. Absent agreement between the parents, however,
there is no reason for the law to assume that financial contribution entitles one to the
benefits of a vertical relationship that were explored in Part II.B.
Undoubtedly, this argument suggests that the risks involved with the traditional
division of parental labor within families are grave: The financial contributor risks
losing the emotional benefits of child rearing, and the emotional caregiver risks
losing the financial support that she may expect if the marriage ends.328 Given the
significant number of women who do not want child support329 and the low
percentage of those who actually receive it,330 and given that even in households
that receive child support, the custodial parent's paycheck is the primary source of
support for the children,331 the people incurring the greater increased risk with the
proposed model will be men. Women who leave the labor force to take care of
children already put themselves at grave financial risk when they become
economically dependent on a man who may leave and who is as unlikely as likely
to pay child support. 332 In contrast, because courts currently split vertical
relationship rights, men are not at risk of losing their potential relationship with their
children even if they have spent the bulk of their time investing in their careers and
not their relationships with their children. This model would change that by
rewarding emotional investment with emotional relationship.333
3. Rights andAutonomy
Other resistance to property rhetoric comes not from its use of investment
theory but from its reliance on rights discourse. Katharine Bartlett is concerned that
328 As mentioned, see supra note 229, a fully developed analysis of paternity and child
support doctrine is well beyond the scope of this Article. I will, preliminarily, suggest that a child
support regime in which the financial contributor's obligation gradually diminishes over time
might be appropriate. A primary caretaker, who has rendered herself economically dependent on
her spouse so that she could take care of the children, should not be left with no source of income
when the relationship ends. However, if she wishes to break completely free from the defunct
horizontal relationship, she must be prepared to leave its financial benefits behind. Thus, the
financial contributor's child support obligation should be seen as more of a temporary measure that
allows the newly reconstituted family (of mother and child(ren)) to get on its feet.
329 See BETL.ER & GRAHAM, supra note 127, at 20-21.
330 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 229, at 4.
331 See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 13 1, at 271.
332 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 229, at 4.
333 Both parties could avoid the increased risk by having couples share more of the financial
and emotional responsibilities ofparenting. In those cases, the emotional investment in relationship




"parents asserting rights to children tend to emphasize what is due to them rather
than what they owe others .... Rights claims tend to exalt the 'my' over the 'ours'
and the T over the 'we."' 334 But if, as the empirical and theoretical research
strongly indicates, many women already speak in terms of "ours" and "we,1335
emphasizing the 'T' over the "we" may be exactly what women need. The 'T' for
the woman is likely to already include the child, and, if that child is to thrive, the law
may have to be more willing to view the parent-child relationship as a right that the
woman has earned. In doing so, the law needs to care less about a defunct horizontal
"we."
Jennifer Nedelsky argues that adjudicating disputes based on a notion of
property rights means that "[r]ights [become] things to be protected, not values to
be collectively determined." 336 However, the collective, value-determining
decisionmaking that Nedelsky calls for may not work. The best interest of the child
standard works badly, if at all. Courts cannot or do not use it, and much scholarship
questions whether children benefit from it.337 In her powerful historical analysis of
the development of property as metaphor, Nedelsky writes that "[p]roperty was an
effective symbol in part because it was not merely a symbol but a concrete means
of having control over one's life, of expressing oneself, and of protecting oneself
from the power of others."338 It still is. And if women's needs for autonomy are
real, then property rhetoric is a logical place to look for help. Nedelsky suggests that
"[i]ndividual autonomy... [has been] ... conceived of as protected by a bounded
sphere-defined primarily by property-into which the state [can] not enter. '339 It
is the boundary imagery itself that Nedelsky condemns because, as discussed above,
connection, not boundary, enables autonomy.3 40 Notions of property focus our
attention on that which we call property and away from that which we are
excluding.341 Yet if much of our culture is still grounded in boundaried metaphors
and if our formal systems ofjustice seem to work best when there are bounded and
defined rights at issue, then refusing the benefits of these discourses may do women
a profound disservice. Women may need and deserve help redirecting their gaze
inward.342 Nedelsky recognizes (and questions) the child development literature
334 Bartlett, supra note 9, at 298 ("Having rights' [also] means to be entitled to, to be owed,
to have earned, or to deserve something in exchange for who one is or what one has done:").
3 35 See supra Part III.A.
336 Nedelsky, supra note 71, at 166.
337 See supra text accompanying notes 192-202.
338 Nedelsky, supra note 71, at 165.
3 39 Nedelsky, supra note 5, at 17.
340 See id. at 12.
341 See Nedelsky, supra note 71, at 177.
342 Women deserve this help because the collective has benefited from women's tendency
to focus on others. As suggested above, see supra text accompanying notes 162-65, it has been
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suggesting that understanding what it means to possess something enables a sense
of self.343 The radical feminist literature suggests that women need that sense of
self.344 Our tendencies toward intimacy and connection threaten it. If property
rhetoric can strengthen a sense of sel, it may well be worth the cost of an imperfect
metaphor.
Women trying to protect their own autonomy while maintaining their
relationships with their children are in what Margaret Radin might call a double
bind, 345 or what Chris Littleton might call a problem of transition.346 Bounded
imagery and traditional liberal constructions of autonomy may not accurately
describe women's reality, but denying women the benefits of these tools only serves
to further disadvantage them. As analyzed in Part JII.A, the less rights-based, more
collectivist notions ofjustice that govern horizontal relationships and intact families
(and also infuse most of the cultural feminist critiques of traditional legal doctrine)
may stifle women's ability to live separate and apart from potentially destructive
relationships. 347 Property paradigms can help construct strong, bounded, and
inwardly-focused vertical relationships that can exist on their own, unhindered by
interference from the state or private parties. Property paradigms foster a sense of
autonomy,348 and that sense of autonomy, imperfect though it may be, can allow
women to break free of intimacies they do not want and grow into lives, voices, and
selves of their own.
C. The Proposal: A Property Interest that Attaches with Investment
A parent's right to be free from state interference into her relationship with her
child should depend on the amount that parent has invested in the relationship and
the extent to which that parent has willingly shared the relationship with others. At
birth, this right should be vested solely with the gestational mother.349 The
women who have been jumping in after the drowning children.
34 3 SeeNedelskysupra note 71, at 171-73. In this part ofherpaperNedelsky explores how
child-development literature relies heavily on boundary imagery and property.
344 See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.
345 See Radin, supra note 164, at 1699-1704.
34 6 See Littleton, supra note 152, at 31.
347 See supra text accompanying notes 149-55.
34 8 As Nedelsky suggests, one cannot be autonomous without feeling autonomous. See
Nedelsky, supra note 5, at 24.
349 With this right should come sole financial responsibility. If a man's genetic connection
to a child does not give him relationship rights to the child, it should not give him financial
responsibility either. As suggested previously, the proposed framework suggests that it is time to
rethink the current paternity system and rely more on a system of assumed commitment (and hence
reliance on the part of the primary caretaker and child) for determining child support obligations.
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gestational mother has invested more than any other human being in the newborn
child. The physical and emotional strains of pregnancy are huge and uniquely
female. A biological father gives his sperm. A gestational mother gives: her egg
(usually), her liver, her bladder, her iron supply, her pulmonary system, her
digestive system, the elasticity of her skin350 and often her psychological well-
being.351 As a result of her physical investment the gestational mother has almost
always invested more emotionally in the child as well.3 52 She feels connected to that
child at an emotional level in a way the biological father cannot because she knows
her child in a way the biological father cannot. That emotional investment entitles
the woman to a greater claim to a relationship with the newborn. As a result she
should have a greater property interest.
As the child grows and other adults invest in relationships with the child, the
gestational mother's initial investment becomes relatively less important. Courts
must respect the investments of other adults if those other adults have a reasonable
expectation that their investment will be protected.353 The expectation is reasonable
as long as the adult has registered his interest. Marriage to the mother is one way of
registering one's property interest in a relationship with the child.354 Adopting the
child with the permission of the mother is another. Indeed, for adults who do not
believe in the institution of marriage or for whom it is not available as an option,
adoption is the best way to record one's interest in the relationship with the child.355
3 5 0 See GERARD N. BURROW & THOMAS F. FERRIS, MEDICAL COMPLICATIONS DURING
PREGNANCY 63 (2d ed. 1982); Douglas Haynes, Course and Conduct ofNormal Pregnancy, in
OBSTErRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 299-316 (David Danforth ed., 3d ed. 1977); Edward J. Quilligan
& Irwan H. Kaiser, Maternal Physiology, in OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, supra, at 276-80.
351 See Quilligan & Kaiser, supra note 350, at 271-72. I do not mean for this list to be
exhaustive. I have yet to show it to a woman who does not want to add numerous other disabling
effects.
352 See LOUIS GENEVIE & EVA MARGOLIES, THE MOTHERHOOD REPORT 95,100-09 (1987);
see also Becker, supra note 175, at 142.
353 Jeremy Bentham wrote that property is a legally protected "expectation... of being able
to draw such or such an advantage from a thing ... according to the nature of the case." BEIrHAM,
supra note 1, at 112. Investment, not biological connection, should give rise to expectation, as long
as it is clear that someone else does not have a superior interest.
354 In this way, my proposal incorporates the contributions of the several commentators who
have argued that substantial and ongoing relationship with the mother, not blood connection,
should determine paternal rights. See Dolgin, supra note 76; Shanley, supra note 76, at 65;
Woodhouse, supra note 9, at 1844-51.
355 In Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 690 (Vt. 1997), the courtrefused to give visitation
rights to the ex-lover of the child's mother because the ex-lover had not adopted the child. The
court declined to adopt an equitable adoption doctrine because it would require too much case-by-
case analysis of whether there was a de facto parental relationship. See id. at 687-88. The court
apparently believed that the more efficient, less litigious and, thus, likely better course for all
involved was to structure the law such that clear title to parenthood can be established, should be
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To demonstrate how this property system would work, the next three sections apply
its principles to the problems of unwed parent adoptions, non-married parents who
share a relationship with the child, and custody disputes between previously married
parents.
1. Unwed Parent Adoptions
Courts should protect an unmarried mother's property interest, as they currently
do not, by privileging the mother's decision at birth. This means that a mother's
desire to keep her pregnancy secret and put the child up for adoption should be
respected. The law need not protect the potential claim that the biological father
might have in developing a relationship with his child. He has not earned the
property interest yet. Thus, putative father registries 356 and adoption statutes
requiring that the father who has demonstrated some interest in the yet-to-be-born
child be given the right to veto a potential adoption 357 are inappropriate. Consider
again the facts of Augusta County Department of Social Services v. Unnamed
Mother.358 To require that divorced mother, who carried the child to term while
raising four other children, to tell the biological father about the child so that he
could develop his own relationship with the child, completely discounts the work
that mother did in carrying and bearing the child. It also gives her a remarkable
incentive to abort the child. She is free to terminate her pregnancy without telling
him. To find, as the law currently does, that her autonomy interest allows her to
terminate the pregnancy, but disappears once the child is born, suggests that her
physical autonomy is all the law need respect.359 However, it was the emotional
need to be free from connection to both this child and the biological father that this
mother needed.
By protecting the potential wishes of the biological father in Augusta County
or even the expressed wishes of the biological father in Baby Girl S.,360 the law
refuses to acknowledge the mother's greater normative claim to control. Whatever
established, and will only be honored if established. See id at 689 (deferring to the state legislature
to determine the classes of persons entitled to parental rights).
356 See, eg., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-64 (1983) (finding against the biological
father challenging an adoption, in part; because the father failed to register with the putative father
registry).
357 For a discussion of the various statutes, see Forman, supra note 76, at 1007-08.
358 348 S.E.2d 26 (Va. Ct App. 1986); see also supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
3591 am not arguing that the state should privilege abortion over birth. I am only pointing out
that contrary to what the states have argued in numerous abortion decisions before the Supreme
Court, in the unwed parent context, the law does privilege abortion over adoption.
360 See In re the Adoption of Baby Girl S., 535 N.Y.S.2d 676, 678 (1988) (granting parental
rights to the biological father where the mother did not want to marry the biological father and did
not want him involved with her pregnancy).
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the biological father's desire to invest the mother invested first and to a greater
degree. The father has done and can do nothing to make his claim to a relationship
any weightier at birth than it is prior to birth when the mother still has the right to
abort. If the law need not respect his desire for connection pre-birth, the law need
not respect his desire post-birth either. He has done nothing to earn it. Mothers of
newborns have the right to exclude.361
The mother's decision to relinquish her right to a relationship by placing the
child up for adoption does not diminish her right to exclude. She is not abandoning
her property interest. She is giving her right to relationship to someone else,
someone who is intentionally not the father. Indeed, the problem in these situations
is that once the biological father is involved, the mother may be unable to free
herself from relationship to the child or its father. That freedom from relationship
is what she wants and what she can only secure by placing the child with adoptive
parents. By electing not to inform the biological father, she is exercising the kind of
authority commonly exerted over property interests; she is controlling its
dispensation.362 She has earned the right to that control through the work she has
done in pregnancy.
A system that vests the gestational mother with complete decisionmaking
authority based on her disproportionate physical and emotional investment in the
child significantly simplifies the current adoption rules and diminishes the potential
for damaging adoption contests. Consider two of the most widely publicized recent
adoption cases, In re Baby Girl Clausen363 and In re Kirchner,364 better known as
361 The right to exclude is generally considered one of the "bundle of rights" that helps
define what property is. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAw4 (2d ed. 1997); MUNZER,
supra note 303, at 22-23.
3 62 The right to transfer property is also considered one of the "bundle of rights" that help
define property. See SINGER, supra note 361, at 4.
363 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). Clara Clausen gave birth to a baby daughter in Iowa,
listing Scott Seefeldt as the father on the birth certificate but knowing that Seefeldt was not the
father. See id. at 652. Seefeldt signed the release of custody form. See id. A married couple from
Michigan, the DeBoers, filed a petition to adopt the child. See id Approximately one month after
the birth, Clausen filed a motion to revoke her release of custody and filed an affidavit revealing
that she had originally lied about Seefeldt being the father. See id She averred that Dan Schmidt
was the real father. See id Schmidt then filed an affidavit of paternity and contested the adoption.
See id Two and half years and five courts (including two separate Supreme Courts decisions) later
Dan Schmidt, who had by this time married Clara Clausen, was awarded custody of the child. See
id. at 668.
364 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995). In January, 1991, Daniella Janikova thought that her
boyfriend, Otokar Kirchner, had abandoned her and married another woman. See id. at 326. She
was pregnant and made plans to put the child up for adoption. See id. When Otokar returned
unmarried, she refused his contact and continued with her plans to give the child up. See id at 327.
After the child was bom, she told Kirchner that the baby had died. See id. Kirchner did not believe
her and three months after the child was bom, sought to intervene in the adoption proceeding. See
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"Baby Jessica" and "Baby Richard." In both cases, the biological, gestational
mothers put the children up for adoption, relinquishing their rights to them.
Subsequently, after finding out about the adoptions, both biological fathers claimed
that they had not properly given their consents to the adoptions. Both cases were in
litigation for years, and both cases were eventually resolved in favor of the
biological father, leaving the children (ages two and four, respectively) to be taken
from the only homes they had ever known in order to protect the rights of their
biological fathers. If the law cared less about protecting abstract notions of
biological fatherhood and more about honoring the physical and emotional
investment that creates relationships, these very sad cases would never have been
before the court.365 The gestational mothers, who had earned the right to decide,
would have had final decisionmaking authority.366
2. Shared Relationships
For women who do not put their children up for adoption, a court's analysis is
potentially more complicated. In many instances, women agree to share their
vertical relationships. By sharing them, mothers dissipate the relative strength of
their own property interests by affording other people the opportunity to invest. A
woman cannot sit by and let someone else invest in her child without being prepared
to relinquish some of her rights. Estoppel doctrine provides the appropriate property
law analogy. Although, in the ordinary course, a license to use another's land is
revocable at any time by the landowner, a landowner cannot stand by and acquiesce
in the licensee's development of the land unless the landowner makes clear that the
licensee's investment is at the licensee's own risk 367 Comparably, if a mother does
i. That proceeding took four years to adjudicate. See id. at 328. In May of 1995, the Illinois
Supreme Court finally invalidated the adoption, and the four year old boy was given to Kirchner
who had since married Janikova. See id. at 340.
365 1 am not arguing that either of these cases were wrongly decided under the law. Indeed,
I think they were both correctly decided under current law because, unlike the adoptive parents in
both cases, I do not think that the best interest of the child standard should govern in all adoption
proceedings. However, I would change the current statutes so that instead of protecting the
(unearned) rights of biological fathers or the (indeterminable) best interests of children, courts
should honor the mothers' decisions. The court should take seriously the mother's relinquishment
of her rights and not be concerned with the biological father's interest in a relationship he has never
known. Neither the Iowa court nor Illinois court was free to do that under existing law.
366 As indicated, supra notes 363-64, the biological fathers in both of these cases have since
reconciled with the biological mothers. The effect of this was to render the biological mothers'
relinquishment of consent almost meaningless. Both biological mothers are currently raising the
children.
367 See, e.g., Camp v. Milam, 277 So.2d 95, 100 (Ala. 1973); Holbrook v. Taylor, 532
S.W.2d 763,766 (Ky. 1976); Vrazel v. Skraganek, 725 S.W.2d 709,712 (Tex. 1987).
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not make clear that she intends to maintain exclusive rights to the vertical
relationship with her child, she risks losing some of it to someone whom she lets
invest.
Some courts already rule in this manner. For instance, the result in Michael
H.368 can be explained by viewing the vertical relationship with the child, Victoria,
as a property interest vested primarily in Carole, the mother and primary caretaker.
Carole allowed Michael-the biological father who was not Carole's husband-to
develop a relationship with Victoria.369 However, the facts suggest that Michael
knew he was investing to his own detriment. Carole's marriage to another man370
put Michael on notice that his investment was not going to be protected legally.
Mere investment in someone else's property does not give the investor a property
interest If Marshall builds on Taney's land,371 but it is clear to Marshall that the
land is owned by Taney, the law does not protect Marshall's investment unless
Taney did something to make Marshall's reliance on his investment reasonable. If
Taney leads Marshall to believe that Marshall's reliance is reasonable, Taney is
estopped from excluding Marshall. Comparably, if Carole had acted in such a way
as to allow Michael to believe that his investment would be legally protected, he
could have asserted a claim on an estoppel theory. If he had invested in his
relationship with Victoria in reasonable reliance that he would have a legally
enforceable claim to reap the benefits of his investment, his investment should be
protected.
Similar reasoning underlies court decisions in the growing number of equitable
parent cases. Courts award parental rights to non-legal parents when the legal parent
has misled the non-parent in some way. Thus, the critical fact in In re Roberts was
that the biological mother misled her husband into believing that he was the
biological father. 372 The husband testified that he had invested in the vertical
relationship thinking that his investment would be protected because the mother told
him he was the father.3 73 On the other hand, the Court in D.G. v. D.MK 374 refused
to adopt the equitable parent doctrine precisely because there had not been any
"detrimental reliance" on the part of the parent asserting the equitable parental
368 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
369 See id at 113-14.
370 See id Carol clearly did not lead Michael to believe that his investment would be
protected because she failed to file the requisite motion for bloodtests that could have rebutted the
statutory presumption that Gerald was Victoria's father. See id. at 115.
371 Marshall and Taney are, of course, Calabresi and Malamed's characters. See Calabresi
& Malamed, supra note 1, at 1071. They are equally useful in this example, however.
372 SeeIn re Roberts, 649 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (111. 1995).
373 See id.
374 557 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 1996).
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claim.375 Therefore, as one should with any investment, before investing a potential
investor should make sure that no one else besides the mother has better title.
Marriage and adoption are means ofregistering one's property interest and quieting
title to a relationship with a child.
For cases in which more than one parent has recorded his or her interest in a
relationship, through marriage or adoption, courts must evaluate the relative
investment of the parties. If there has been equal or close to equal investment in the
relationship with the children, then courts must muddle through the process of
dividing property between joint owners. This process will be difficult, but no more
difficult than what courts currently do when making custody decisions under a
primary caretaker or a best interest of the child standard. Indeed, the proposed
framework asks courts to do even less of this difficult evaluation. Unlike the current
regime in which courts continually evaluate what is in the child's best interest (when
asked to by a parent asserting positive parental rights), under the proposed model,
once the court has evaluated the relative investment of the parties for initial custody
purposes, it should defer to the negative parental rights of the parent awarded
custody. If, at the initial stage, the court finds that the parental investments are truly
comparable, then joint custody may be appropriate. However, in situations in which
there have really been comparable investments in relationship with the children, it
is likely that the parents will want to continue to share their vertical relationship
rights with each other.376 Few parents who really love their children will want to
deprive their children of positive, enriching vertical relationships.377 Many adults
choose some form of shared custody arrangement,378 but joint custody works, when
it works, not because courts order it but because parents want it to work for the sake
37 5 See id at 242.
37 6 Maccoby and Mnookin found that mothers resisted fathers' custody claims when they
felt that the father had not been substantially involved with the child rearing process before
divorce. When fathers had been involved, women accommodated more shared parenting
agreements after divorce. See MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 131, at 272.
377 A custodial parent who eams less money than the non-custodial parent also has a
financial incentive to keep the non-custodial parent involved. The more custodial parents try to
separate from their ex-spouses, the less valid are their claims to child support. Nonetheless, one's
right to separate from a former spouse, if one chooses, should not be diminished simply because
one's spouse has a history of supporting the children financially. See generally supra text
accompanying notes 323-27.
378 See CIJI WARE, SHARING PARENTING AFrER DIVORCE 16 (1982); Constance R. Ahrons,
The Coparental Divorce: Preliminary Research Findings and Policy Implications, in JOINT
CuSToDY: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES, LAWYERS AND COuNsELORS Cl, C7 (Ass'n of Family
Conciliation Courts ed., 1979); Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited: What
Custodial Arrangements Are Parents Negotiating, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS,
supra note 73, at 37, 54-55; Susan Steinman, The Experience of Children in a Joint-Custody
Arrangement, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403, 406-07 (1981).
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of their children.379
3. Custody Modification
Custody and visitation agreements, even if amicably negotiated and complied
with at first, are often subject to modification. They have to be; custodial parents'
lives are not static. As illustrated above, however, courts often discount women's
needs to redirect the course of their lives. Sometimes courts do this by focusing
solely on the child's interests and ignoring how the child will benefit from the
custodial mother's own financial or emotional growth, and sometimes courts do this
by privileging a status quo that does not permit custodial mothers room for growth.
A conceptual shift towards property could influence the kinds of tests courts use to
adjudicate these modifications, diminish judicial tendencies to ignore women's
needs, and encourage courts to honor the custodial parent's customary desire to
exercise dominion over that which is hers.
For instance, property paradigms will encourage a court to presume that a
custodial parent acts in the child's best interest.380 This is the constitutional
presumption that married parents enjoy, and it is in accord with the assumption that
property owners generally act in a way that best protects their property.381 Hence,
in relocation cases, courts should place the burden on the non-custodial spouse to
prove that a change in custodial arrangement is not in the child's best interest. That
burden will be met only if the non-custodial parent overcomes the pre-existing
presumption in favor of the move.382 Courts should recognize the substantial
379 Many divorced couples are satisfied with their joint custody agreements, but most of the
studies involve voluntary joint custody arangements. See Chambers, supra note 194, at 551 n284,
552. We also know very little about the joint custody arrangements that fall apart. See id at 558.
There is little evidence suggesting that joint custody is beneficial for children. See Jana Singer &
William Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 505-11 (1988). Some
research suggests that it is actually detrimental to children. See Rosemary McKinnon & Judith
Wallerstein, Joint Custody and the Preschool Child, 4 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 169, 176-82 (1986). As
discussed earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 203-06, relationships that increase tension
in the child's household(s) do more harm than good.
380 Some courts are beginning to do this. In Wolinski v. Browneller, the custodial parent
argued that the court was required to presume that her proposed grandparent visitation was in the
child's best interest. See Wolinski v. Browneller, 693 A2d 30,35 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1997). The
court agreed. See id. at 45.
381 To a certain extent, the problem of too many potential parental interests and too few
defined Tights can be seen as a tragedy ofthe commons problem. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy
of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968) (stating that no individual will take adequate
care of a resource if everyone has a claim to that resource).
382 Courts struggle with the burden ofproofproblem. In Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, the court
put the burden of proof on the non-custodial parent to show that the move would have some
negative impact on the child, but then said that once that was shown, neither parent had the burden
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overlap between the needs of custodial parents and their children and not fall victim
to the tempting tendency to assume that a child will be better off maintaining a
relationship with a non-custodial parent. In an ideal world, all children could
maintain relationships with all parents, but the world of divorce is never ideal. A
child benefits when a custodial parent takes care of herself emotionally and
financially.383 If a substantial relationship exists between the non-custodial parent
and the child, non-custodial parents can rebut the presumption in favor of the move.
If, the relationship is of the more typical infrequent visitation type, however, courts
should be less willing to protect the potential for a relationship that has yet to
materialize.
Courts should also cease assuming that, by taking care of her own needs, the
custodial spouse is somehow not taking care of her children's needs. In any given
instance, a custodial parent may not give adequate consideration to her children's
interests, but courts should not assume that just because parents are divorced they
manipulate their children or subordinate their children's interests.384 A married
parent is not forced to sacrifice her own emotional well-being for the sake of her
children; why do courts assume that a non-married parent must make that sacrifice?
A custodial parent's decision to date a new person or to put herself through school
may cause some short-term difficulties for the child, but no investment is painless,
and the interdependency that marks relationship3 85 means that productive
investment by one person will benefit those with whom she is in relationship. By
helping herself, the custodial parent is helping her child, and the non-custodial
parent has no right to tell her how to manage her property.
Thus, non-custodial parents can be viewed as people with both a type of
contingent remainder and executory interest.386 If something happens to the
custodial parent, the vertical relationship with the child becomes primarily the non-
custodial parent's interest. In this sense, they are remaindermen. Comparably, if the
custodial parent violates a condition of parenthood, then the non-custodial parent
of establishing what was in the best interest of the child. See Ramirez-Barker v. Barker, 418 S2E2d
675,679 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). Other courts have placed the burden squarely on the non-custodial
parent to show that the move would not be in the child's interest, see Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d
393, 395 (Minn. 1983), while still others have placed the burden ofproving the child's best interest
on the moving spouse, see Seesel v. Seesel, 748 S.W.2d 422,424 (Tenn. 1988).
383 See Johnston, supra note 134, at 174 ("Findings indicate that the custodial parent's own
adjustment is the best predictor of child adjustment.").
384 As Martha Fineman has noted, "if it were true that a large number of parents can
comfortably be presumed to have the tendency to sacrifice their children's well-being [at divorce],
isn't the real conclusion we should reach be that there are many people who are unfit parents ... "
Fineman, supra note 197, at 852.
385 See supra text accompanying notes 37-40, 50-51.




has a kind of executory interest. But the conditions of parenthood should not be any
different for the custodial parent just because she does not have a spouse. The
executory interest should not vest unless the custodial parent seriously compromises
the future interest of the non-custodial parent. It must not vest simply because the
non-custodial spouse or a court might make a parenting decision differently. Future
interest holders cannot dictate the conditions under which the present interest stays
vested.
If courts come to understand the vertical relationship between parent and child
in the context of bounded property rhetoric, they will be more likely to reward
women for the investment that women usually make in their children. They will be
less afraid of vesting women with greater control over parenting decisions, and they
will be more likely to recognize that women have compelling needs to move on
with their lives and to take their property with them when they go. Such a shift
would encourage courts to see that just as men have needs for connection and
interdependence that the law respects when families are intact women have needs
for autonomy and independence that the law should respect when families are not
intact.
D. Property Theory and Horizontal Relationships
What does all of this property talk mean for horizontal relationships? Quite
possi'bly nothing at all. The law already treats marriages as boundaried relationships
into which it should tread lightly. If the arguments for this deference are persuasive,
then the deference should continue and doctrines based upon it like family privacy,
spousal immunity, spousal privilege, and family autonomy should remain intact.387
On the other hand, if one is persuaded that legal deference to horizontal relationship
does more harm than good, then perhaps, as other feminists have argued, marriage
should cease to exist as a legal category.388 If one believes that the law's protection
of marriage brings with it both benefits and burdens, then arguably we should
proceed as we currently are, respecting boundaries when horizontal relationships are
clearly intact but being careful to make sure that the exit signs are clearly marked
for those who want or need to leave the relationship.389
387 For a brief discussion of these doctrines, see supra notes 11, 12, 64.
388 This is the position taken by Fineman. See FJNEMAN, supra note 29, at 8; cf. Polikoff,
supra note 30, at 1536.
38 9 The creeping erosion of both spousal immunity and spousal privilege doctrine show how
the law is less respectful of boundaries than it used to be, but still careful to protect them at times.
Some states have eliminated the spousal immunity doctrine completely. See CLARK, supra note
64, at 633, 635. Others have eliminated it only for intentional torts. See id If one believes that legal
recognition of marriage serves important goals, then this partial respect for the immunity makes
sense. An intentional act by one spouse against another does enough damage to the relationship
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The property analysis does suggest that women should be careful before
entering into marriage. As analyzed, marriage may stifle potentially important
desires for autonomy and independence, and it necessarily erodes the otherwise sole
right women would have to their children. It is important for women to keep these
concerns in mind. However, it is unlikely that women will start either fleeing their
marriages or running to sperm banks. Most women value horizontal relationships
just as much as, if not more than, men do because women place more value on and
root more of their identity in relationships. 390 Making women more aware that they
can leave a relationship will not necessarily lead them to do so. Moreover, because
healthy horizontal relationships are interdependent, wives may benefit from the
extent to which legal protection of marriage encourages their husbands to become
more caring, intimate, and selfless.
Also, one need not worry (if "worry" is the appropriate term) about women
parenting children without men so that the women can enjoy exclusive parental
rights. As I have analyzed elsewhere, although most women invest more in vertical
relationships than do men, what most single parents want is not exclusive parental
rights, but an opportunity to share the expressive, enriching, and exhausting
experiences of parenthood with someone else.391 Most women currently choosing
to have children without a partner are doing so not because they want exclusive
control, but because they cannot find someone with whom they can share their
control.3 92 Vertical relationships, in part because they'involve so much work and
to make legal protection of the res unjustifiable. Negligent infliction of harm, on the other hand,
likely does less damage to the relationship, thts leaving the res viable and worthy of protection.
The subordination of individual rights implicit in respecting the res in this manner would only
seem appropriate, however, if divorce were readily available. If one party is willing to sacrifice the
res (by getting divorced) in order to sue, the res need not be protected.
Comparably, courts have severely limited the adverse spousal testimony privilege in recent
years, but the spousal communication privilege has come under relatively little attack. See id. at
638. Milton Regan defends both the testimony privilege and the communications privilege as
important symbolic statements about the law's respect for the unity created by marriage. See
Regan, Spousal Privilege, supra note 37, at 2156. The existence of these privileges encourages
individuals within marriage to think of themselves not only as individuals apart from their
marriages, but as individuals whose identities cannot be defined outside of their intimate
connections. See id. at 2049. If legal recognition of marriage encourages interconnection and
intimacy, then there are sound reasons for keeping both the testimonial and communication
privilege alive.
390 Parts II and III suggest that what makes women different from men is the extent to which
they invest in and value these relationships without the law's help.
39 1 See Katharine K. Baker, Taking Care of Our Daughters, 18 CARDOZO L. REv. 1495,
1519 (1997) (reviewing FNEMAN, supra note 29) (stating that most of the single mothers of today,
although they are mothers by choice, are not single by choice).
392 See SHEILA B. KAMERMAN & ALFRED J. KAHN, MoTHERS ALoNE 136-37 (1988)
(discussing the growing class of single, educated, economically secure women who choose to have
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so much joy, are a form of property that most people yeam to share.
The property analysis also provides little assistance to the conundrum of
spousal maintenance. As defined throughout this Article, the res created by legal
recognition of family is the relationship itself. Investment in that relationship gives
one a stronger claim to the res. At divorce, the relationship is dissolved. The res is
gone. Although there may be many reasons and theories pursuant to which we
should award spousal maintenance,393 an earned interest in the horizontal
relationship is not one of them because at divorce the res is worth nothing. The
relationship is null and void.
What property analysis suggests for horizontal relationships, therefore, is that
women should be aware of the doors that close when one enters into a boundaried
union. Many women may be comfortable with these closed doors because they are
comfortable with the interdependence and selflessness that governs the world of
boundaried relationship, and they would rather sacrifice their own autonomy for the
sake of the collectivist goals of family. What is most important is that women
understand how the boundary operates so that their decision to cross it is an
informed and meaningful one.
V. CONCLUSION
Much feminist scholarship calls for tearing down familial veils of privacy394
and expunging property rhetoric. I have argued, instead, that the freedom from the
state that veils of privacy can provide and the clarity that property rhetoric affords
serve important and deserving values. The problem lies not in the existence of
privacy veils and property rhetoric, but instead on when the law has afforded their
shelter and privilege.
To the extent that horizontal relationships foster interdependence, selflessness,
and forgiveness, they should be honored as entities worthy of the state's deference
and respect. Healthy horizontal relationships make us happy. However, we must
also be mindful of marriage's potential dangers. Interdependence rooted in an
exchange of intimacy for financial support may feel much more like vulnerability
than transcendence for many women. The kind of sacrifice and connection
children on their own, but who readily admit that they would rather be parenting with someone
else).
393 Among these reasons and theories are: the importance of encouraging investment in
horizontal relationship and intimacy, the need to compensate for reasonable expectation of shared
wealth, and the desire to address unjust enrichments. See generally Ellman, supra note 182 (stating
theories that justify alimony).
394 See CAThARNE A. MACKINNoN, Privacy and Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
FEMnIISM UNMODIFMD, supra note 142, at 93, 97; Elizabeth Schneider, The Violence of Privacy,
23 CONN. L. REV. 973, 974-75 (1991).
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necessary to keep families together does not come without cost. To the extent that
women invest disproportionately in these values, their work must be honored.
One way to value this intimacy, in the vertical relationship context, is to award
parental rights based on the extent to which parents invest in intimacy. At present,
the law respects, by way of awarding negative parental rights, only those vertical
relationships that are supported by a horizontal relationship between legal parents.
The law does not evaluate whether a parent has demonstrated the kind of
selflessness, forgiveness, and nurturance necessary for real relationship. The failure
of courts to evaluate the substantive connection between parent and child and the
courts' willingness to assume connection when none is demonstrated results in a
devaluation of the intimacy work that women do. It also demonstrates that courts
protect men's potential desires for connection at the expense of women's desires for
autonomy.
Understanding the right to a vertical relationship with a child as a property right
celebrates the importance of intimate relationships while insulating primary
caretakers from both state and private party attacks on their child rearing. By casting
the vertical relationship right as a property right for which one must labor, the law
may finally come to respect that men should enjoy parental rights only if they have
done the work of intimacy, lived the life of interdependence, and experienced the
kind of selflessness that justify legal privilege of relationship. Vertical privacy
protection will force men to work for a place behind the veil by requiring that they
work for that which the law has always assumed to be theirs, namely, relationships
with their children.
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